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1 Section A - ownership in context: why market participant accountability 
matters. 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 The broad issue of control of public companies 
By making ordinary business decisions managers now have more power than most 
sovereign governments to determine where people will live, what work they will do, if any; what 
they will eat, drink and wear; what sorts of knowledge, schools and universities they will 
encourage; and what kind of society their children will inherit.2 
Public companies exert significant, and growing, influence over the daily lives of individuals all 
over the world. There is therefore developing concern and awareness of the broad issues of 
their control, monitoring, transparency and accountability. The increasing frequency wi th 
which governments, past and present, have instituted reviews of the exercise by the owners of 
these companies of their responsibilities of ownership, and of the effectiveness of our systems 
of corporate governance, accounting, auditing and disclosure, suggests that this concern is both 
widespread and being taken very seriously. This concern has been particularly marked after 
numerous manifest failures of control systems in place both at home in the UK and the US, but 
also in other countries wi th less developed systems and processes of corporate governance. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of capital markets in the monitoring 
and governance of these companies, specifically looking at the transparency and accountability 
of market participants, especially institutional investors, in the governance process. 
2 
Richard J Barnet & Ronald Mueller, quoted in "Corporate Governance", 3 r d Edition, Monks & Minow, 37 
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This thesis is divided into six uneven parts. In this first section the author w i l l 
demonstrate the importance of the role that market participants play in corporate governance 
and explain why it is important that they are accountable for the way in which they participate 
in this process. The second section w i l l focus on transparency of ownership as a crucial 
component of the overall transparency process - and explain why transparency of ownership is 
effectively a precursor to effective f u l l market transparency. In addition i t w i l l examine a 
number of non-governance related issues. The third section w i l l attempt to set transparency of 
ownership in the context of the real world marketplace, by looking at the existing ownership 
structures, explain the importance and specific problems created by the prevailing trust 
structures used, and look at the implications of institutional "outsourcing" by pension funds 
and other key participants to dedicated institutional management firms, and the problems this 
creates for market accountability. In the fourth section the author sets out a proposed 
benchmark, taking into consideration all of the issues and qualifications developed in the 
second and third sections. The last two sections w i l l , respectively, compare existing legal 
structures in several key markets to the proposed benchmark, and make some tentative 
suggestions for reform. 
1.2 The case for market participant involvement in corporate governance 
This section w i l l set out a case for, and the importance of, the active involvement of 
capital market participants in the corporate governance process. It w i l l show that 
institutional investors play a central role in the governance process, especially in the 
context of monitoring and oversight. It w i l l also be shown that, given the societal 
importance of the protection of ownership rights and the natural self-interest and 
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conflicts of interest of corporate managers, market participants are best placed to protect 
and enforce such rights. However, it w i l l also be argued that capital markets suffer f rom 
similar conflicts of interest and w i l l introduce the second section of this thesis which 
argues for increased transparency of market participant behaviour, specifically of the 
securities in which they are interested. 
1.2.1 What is corporate governance and what role do capital markets and institutional 
investors play? 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. 
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By 
doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance3 
Institutional investors play a vital role in the allocation of global capital to industry. The 
author intends to show through this thesis that the accountability of these participants is 
inadequate given the significant, i f under realised, role that they play in the governance of 
public companies. It is, however, important to understand that, for the purpose of this thesis, a 
discussion of, and argument related to, corporate governance w i l l be primarily focused on the 
means by which these providers of capital can be guaranteed, with reasonable and discrete 
certainty, the means to, but not the realisation of, satisfactory returns on their investments, 
such that the market is free to compensate investment risk at an appropriate and undistorted 
rate. In other words, the author takes corporate governance to be primarily concerned wi th 
3 OECD April 1999. OECD's definition is consistent with the one presented by Cadbury [1992, page 15] 
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making sure that investors have adequate realisable protections to enable them to secure a 
reasonable return on their investments, but is not concerned wi th ensuring that such returns 
actually happen. The key to this distinction is recognising that corporate governance concerns 
itself wi th the form and process of decision making and not w i th the substance of those 
decisions. An example of this distinction is illustrated by examining the issue of dividend 
policy and payments. 
Dividend payments have been the subject of significant legislative attention. Generally, 
the law has been concerned with ensuring dividends are paid equally, minority shareholders 
do not suffer prejudice, and that shareholders' rights to a dividend are not exercised at the 
expense of other capital providers4. However, it is very rare to f ind legislation concerned wi th 
the levels of payout ratios, other than in certain specific industry-systemic cases, such as US 
state ut i l i ty companies. Donald C. Cook, Commissioner of the SEC in 1951 stated that "Of 
course, dividend policy must vary for each company and must take into consideration 
numerous factors such as capital ratios, the nature and volatility of the company's load, size and 
history of the company..."5 In other words, the returns available in dividends to investors are 
not a matter of regulation of governance systems, but are down to the circumstances of each 
individual company and its investors. Thus, primarily due to time and length constrictions, this 
thesis w i l l not consider issues related to comparative analysis of capital costs or capital returns 
under various markets and governance systems. 
4 C.f. s.830(2) of the Companies Act 2006 (Replacing s.263(3) of the Companies Act, 1985), provides that "a 
company's profits available for distribution are [only] its accumulated realised profits", which particularly provides 
protection for a company's creditors. 
5 Excerpt taken from address entitled "The Current Utility Scene", made by Commissioner Donald C. Cook of the 
SEC on March 29, 1950. Quoted in "Security Analysis", Graham & Dodd, 1951, 592 & 736 
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1.2.1.1 The importance of the protection of owner's rights. 
The protection of owners' 6 rights is essential for economic prosperity and development, 
for without it not only wil l capital flow to more secure regions, but capital that is invested in 
regions with lower protection wil l have a higher cost as the suppliers of capital demand to be 
compensated for the higher risk 7. 
This is a well established academic position, with the author's case well summarised in 
Copeland's work on shareholder value: 
Regardless of what you think about the merit of stakeholder claims relative to each other, one thing 
is certain: if suppliers of capital do not receive a fair return to compensate them for the risk they are 
taking, they will move their capital across national borders in search of better returns. If they are 
prohibited by law from moving their capital, they will consume more and invest less. Either way, 
nations who don't provide global investors with adequate returns on invested capital are doomed to 
fall farther behind in the race for global competitiveness and suffer a stagnating or decreasing 
standard of living [author's emphasis]...It is easy to see how capital flows when we look at the 
world from an investor's point of view. If ROIC [Return on Invested Capital] is less than zero, a 
company cannot generate enough cash to stay in business... if the ROIC is greater than zero but less 
than its weighted average cost of capital (WACC) the company may be "profitable" but it will not 
provide an adequate return to the suppliers of capital...the company is destroying value...when 
capital is not earning the required rate of return the market decreases its value until the rate of return 
reaches competitive levels. Value is destroyed.8 
6 For the purpose of brevity, where the term "owners" is used in this thesis, the author is referring to the owners of 
all instruments, derivative or otherwise, where the underlying security is a public company or subsidiary thereof. 
7 See A. Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, London Oxford University Press, 1991 
8 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (McKinsey & Company, Inc.), "Valuation : Measuring and Managing the Value of 
Companies", 1995, 27-28 
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1.2.2 Managers, when left entirely to their own devices, w i l l generally act to further their 
own interests rather than the interests of investors. 
I f the suppliers of capital do not either put in place themselves, or, arising f rom a legal 
and regulatory regime, have structural measures already in place, managers w i l l , generally 
speaking, use their positions of control and authority to act primarily in their own interest. 
These self concerned activities have been dubbed the "private benefits of control" 9 and the 
forms they take and how they are exercised have been adequately covered by existing research 
that does not need to be repeated or summarised here1 0. The costs of these private benefits are 
significant - not only to investors who w i l l see a reduced return on their invested capital, but 
to the economy and society as a whole - where capital is allocated and used inefficiently, 
products w i l l inevitably become less competitive and providers of labour w i l l suffer as their 
jobs disappear. Market participants are best placed to monitor the managers and directors of 
firms; given the impact that self-interested behaviour may have on individual economies the 
accountability of those market participants is vital. 
1.2.3 Managers should act wi th the primary aim of maximising long term return on equity, 
except under very specific legally defined circumstances. 
Otherwise known as the doctrine of shareholder primacy, i t is generally accepted that 
the concerns of shareholders are the primary concern of managers. In the UK, directors have 
9 Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart, 1988, "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control", Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20, 175-202 
1 0 For examples see : Baumol, William, 1959, "Business Behaviour, Value and Growth", Macmillan (New York). 
Jensen, Michael, 1986, "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers", American Economic 
Review, 76, 323-329. 
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fiduciary duties, a concept developed in the law of Trusts, to the company itself, which has in 
practice been taken to mean the members. In the US, the case law is equally clear: "A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the 
reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes."11 
In the UK, the issue might have been blurred by s.309 of the Companies Act 1985. This 
amendment appeared, on its face, to require a company's directors to consider the interests of a 
company's employees. The CLR, in its strategic framework, has ruled out a "dualistic" approach 
and come down in favour of an "enlightened shareholder" approach12. This uncertainty has 
been ful ly resolved in the Companies Act 2006, under s. 172, which lists a number of factors 
and considerations that directors should note, but only for 'strategic' reasons. This recognises 
that the interests of the "enlightened" shareholder are best served, for example, where 
employees are developed and satisfied in their labour and when the consumer's interests are 
recognised. Adam Smith stated that "[a businessman] intends only his own gain [but] he 
is...led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is not his intention...by pursuing his 
own interest, he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really 
1 1 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668 664 (Mich. 1919) 
1 2 See Ch. 5.1 and Ch. 2 para's 3.20 - 3.31 
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intends to promote i t " 1 3 (this author's emphasis). Berle & Means whilst disagreeing in their 
conclusion recognised that 
Organization under the system of private enterprise has rested upon the self-interest of the property 
owner - a self interest held in check only by competition and the conditions of supply and demand. Such 
self-interest has long been regarded as the best guarantee of economic efficiency14 
Furthermore, the great unperceived irony of counter-arguments to this position, is that 
those groups who are often most audible in their insistence for other interests to govern 
managerial decisions are the providers of labour, and it is precisely this group that has the most 
to gain out of managers running public companies in the interest of shareholders. 
Shortly before the year 2000 there will be more workers in companies that are more than 15 
percent employee held than in the entire US trade union movement. The property rights of workers 
will dwarf labor laws as an option for influence in corporations. For the first time since the 1930's 
America will see a new wave of employee activist...but this time unions will be joined by 
company-wide employee associations - ad hoc and co-ordinated - asking for a say because they are 
either the dominant shareholder or the second major shareholder in the f irm 1 5 
There are however some qualifications to this position. As a company approaches insolvency, 
this position does change and directors' duties shift somewhat from the shareholders to the 
creditors1 6. The only other circumstances where this position changes is where there is a 
specific relationship between one or more directors and one or more shareholders where 
1 3 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, at 423 
1 4 Berle & Means, "The modem corporation and private property", 1991, at 8. 
1 5 Blasi & Kruse, "The new owners: The emergence of Employee Ownership in Public Companies and What it 
means to American business", New York, 1991 at 3. Also see Drucker, "The Unseen Revolution, How Pension 
Fund Socialism Came to America", New York, 1976, esp. at 1. 
1 6 Note s. 172(3) Companies Act 2006, and also West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. V. Dodd [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 CA and 
Re Welfab Engineers ltd. [1990] B.C.L.C. 833 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership - 10 -
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
specific additional duties may apply 1 7. Given that the above position is generally applicable to 
small or family run companies it can be set aside f rom consideration, except in the context of 
takeover bids1 8, although for public companies in the UK this issue is fu l ly dealt w i th under the 
City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. 
1.2.4 A company, whilst being a separate legal person, does not have interests of its own -
merely those of its members. 
Some commentators, academic and professional, have argued passionately that 
corporations exist as separate entities wi th discrete interests and objectives19. Some have 
compounded this discussion wi th the issue of the interests and objectives of the corporation 
wi th the consequence of relegating the interests of the shareholders to below those of other 
members of society: 
For the corporation is merely the way of doing things.. .The special interests or needs of individuals 
who occupy some place in the corporate structure are inferior in importance to the functional 
effectiveness of the corporation itself. What, then is the true status of the stockholder? If the 
corporation will survive only should it continue to prove itself the best way of meeting society's 
need for expansion of the means of production, does not this leave the stockholder in a somewhat 
questionable position? Of course it does. It subordinates the interest of the individual partial 
proprietor to the larger social interests of which the corporation is the most important organic unit.20 
The author does not accept any argument that a company exists as a distinct entity 
wi th independent objectives and interests - except under legal "fiction" as a distinct legal 
1 7 See Peskin v. Anderson [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 372 at 379 also see Coleman v. Myers [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 255 NZCA 
1 8 See Re A Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 
1 9 C.f. Concept of the Corporation, Peter F. Drucker, New York, 1946. Drucker writes a total of 290 pages on the 
subject, without mentioning shareholders, stockholders or owners once, nor do these words or equivalent appear 
once in the index. 
2 0 Jackson Martindell, "The scientific appraisal of management", 1950, at 136-138 
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person wi th its own discrete set of interests and objectives. Nourse L.J. states, "The interests of 
a company, as an artificial person, cannot be distinguished f rom the interests of the person who 
are interested in i t " . 2 1 The objectives of the owners of a company are the objectives of the 
company, and hence of management - and nothing else. Whilst accepting this is a contentious 
issue, the author takes the generally accepted position and does not consider i t appropriate to 
defend it i n detail here, save to quote Graham and Dodd's response to these arguments. 
We disagree with this view of the public stockholder's position. To our mind it has dangerous 
implications not only for investors but for the cause of free enterprise as well. It has led, on the one 
hand, to the suggestion of Berle and Means that the large corporation be controlled in the interest of 
the "wider public" rather than of the public stockholders; on the other hand, to James Burnham's 
prediction that, just as the public stockholder has abdicated control of large business to their 
managements, so the citizen is certain to abdicate control of the state to the managerial class. If 
stockholders act as intelligent owners they will serve society adequately, in the same way as the 
merchant serves society by running his business skilfully and the worker serves society by doing his 
job well and being paid for it well. Any other concept of the function of corporate ownership is 
likely to result in confused standards, in the exploitation of stockholders, and in the discouragement 
of investment in equity securities22 
1.2.5 Just as managers are essentially self-interested, so are capital market participants. 
These participants are not only self-interested but are also subject to a variable, 
complex and opaque web of inter-related conflicts of interest. Their accountability is 
therefore absolutely crucial just as i t is w i t h company managers. 
No one, however professional or experienced, is immune to either self-interested 
behaviour, or to conflicts of interest. There has been a lot of criticism, particularly recently, of 
company managers for both conflicts of interest as well as for their self-interested behaviour. 
2 1 See Brady v. Brady [1988] B.C.L.C. 20 at 40, C A - dictum by Nourse L.J. 
2 2 Graham & Dodd, "Security Analysis", 3 r d Edition 1951, New York, at 610 (their emphasis as quoted). 
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This is important and valid, but ignores the fact that those who are often pointing the finger, 
market participants, are also subject to exactly the same sort of conflicts and self-interests, even 
though they manifest themselves in different ways. 
"I believe there is now a fundamental imbalance between the obligations of openness and 
transparency which are laid on the corporate sector and those of the financial institutions and the 
banks... Companies enjoy some flexibility in the policies they apply and how they report against 
them; and observers and stakeholders are expected to make an overall judgement in the light of this 
as to whether a company is living up to the spirit rather than simply the letter of a code... [which] 
builds and rewards trustworthy behaviour...[however] turn the spotlights onto the financial markets 
[and] frankly I do not see the same quality of governance or transparency in all of its dealings. Nor 
do 1 detect a strong will to tackle the problem effectively"23 
The best way to approach this discussion is to divide market participants into two 
discrete groups, the institutional buyers and sellers of securities (commonly known as the 
"buy-side") and the arrangers, agents, advisers and "transact-ors" (this group includes those 
often referred to as the "sell-side"), and to look at their position entirely separately. 
1.2.5.1 The "buy-side" 
This group are obviously the most important group to consider in this process. They 
include managers of pension funds, unit-trusts, o.e.i.c.s, insurance companies, hedge funds and 
private-client wealth managers, among others. A breakdown showing funds under 
management between these groups is show in table 1.3.5.A below. The single largest problem 
in analysing the transparency of this group is its diversity. The set of objectives and behaviour, 
for example, of pension fund managers differs wildly from those of unit trust managers. 
2 3 John Sunderland, speech given 21" April 2005 (the author is grateful to Mr. Sunderland, and to Liz Atkins of 
Cadbury-Schweppes, for making a printed version available to the author on request). Speech originally reported 
in the Financial Times 22 n d April 2005 edition, page 1. 
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Table 1.3.5.A - extract f r o m the Myners report on Insti tutional Investment 
End Year 
Institution 1963(%) 1975(%> 1981 (%) 1989 (%) 1994(%> 1997 (%) 1998 O ) 1999(%) 
Pension funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8 22.1 21.7 19.6 
Insurance companies 10.0 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9 23.5 21.6 21.6 
Unit trusts, investment trusts 
& other financial institutions 12.6 14.6 10.4 8.6 10.1 10.6 9.0 9.7 
Banks 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 
Total UK institutions 30.3 46.0 57.9 58.5 60.2 56.3 52.9 51.9 
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3 16.5 16.7 15.3 
Other personal sector 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.3 
Public sector 1.5 3.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Industrial & commercial 
companies 5.1 3.0 5.1 3.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 2.2 
Overseas 7.0 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3 24.0 27.6 29.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ONS, 'Share Ownership. A Report on the ownership of shares at 31/12/99', p8. 
Furthermore "hedge funds" can differ so widely i n terms of their behaviour, nature and 
size that it is hard to compare any two wi th each other. The following general observations can 
however be made: 
1) In general, the fund management industry has performed extremely badly over 
both the short and medium term to the extent that the average fund manager 
would have performed better had he not changed his holdings even once over the 
past 10 years24. However, fund managers still compare their performance 
primarily to index-based benchmarks and are rewarded according to their gains 
or losses relative to this index over a short term period. 
2) There are few legal means available to obtain information on either the 
performance of fund managers as owners (i.e. their voting records, time spent in 
meetings wi th management, feedback processes to management etc.) or the terms 
of their remuneration - or even a general remuneration policy or framework. 
2 4 Quoted by Paul Myners in his speech at the 2005 IIRF Conference in Amsterdam, a recording is available at 
http://www.iirf.org/calendar/conferences/2005amsterdam 
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This is in very sharp contrast to the reporting duties that are laid upon the 
management of public companies in both the UK and the US. Concerns have also 
been raised over the fees charged by certain sectors of the industry: "The hedge 
fund industry is remarkable. They seem universally to charge 2% commission and 
20% of the alpha. It looks a lot like retail price maintenance...or perhaps there is 
another name for it?" 2 5 
3) Fund managers are subject to serious conflicts of interest wi th regard to the way 
they behave as owners. 2 6 Monks characterises the fund management industry as a 
"Web of mutually self-supporting interests" and subject to "conflicts of interest 
that envelop the institutional ownership world" 2 7 It has been argued that the 
heart of these conflicts are a misalignment of corporate direction and shareholder 
interests as well as issues of stewardship and wealth creation 2 8. It is regularly 
argued that, in general, these conflicts result f rom problems of agency29, most 
importantly the conflicts between internal management and outside owners that 
result f rom the separation of ownership and control 3 0. Ingley and Van Der Walt 
argue that: 
2 5 John Sunderland, supra. 
2 6 See Gunther, "Investors of the World Unite!", 2002, Fortune Magazine, 145, 78 
2 7 Monks, "Creating value through Corporate Governance", Corporate Governance : An International Review, 
2002, 10, 116-123 
2 8 C.f. Healey, "Corporate Governance & Wealth Creation in New Zealand", 2003, Palmerton North, NZ 
2 9 Kose & Senbet, "Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness", 1998, Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, 371-
403 
3 0 See Paris, "A compound option model to value moral hazard", Journal of Derivatives, 2001, 9, at 53-62 Kostant, 
"Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the course of corporate governance and counsel's changing role", Journal of Socio 
Econonics, 1999, 28, at 203-247. Brown Jr., "What do institutional investors really want?", Corporate Board, 1998, 
17, 5-10. Kose and Senbet, "Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness", Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 
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Separation of ownership and control has resulted in managerial dominance and concentration of 
power among corporate elites. Contribution to this asymmetry of power and control is the abdication 
by shareholders of their responsibility as owners through passivity and absence of voice in the affairs 
of the corporations in which they invest...Since different types of capital contributors and other 
stakeholders have different types of utility functions from the firm, the conflicts of interest that 
develop and the agency problems they cause are dissimilar. The utility function of different classes of 
stakeholders also varies and the degree of alignment of interests with those agents in the firm who 
control the major decisions is also different. This gives rise to conflicts among stakeholders and these 
"Incentive" conflicts have become known as agency (principal-agent) problems. Uninhibited, each 
class of stakeholders will pursue its own interests... at the expense of the other stakeholders 3 1 
Much of this thesis is concerned wi th examining some of the impacts of just this principal 
agency problem. However the author believes that there are three additional areas of 
conflict that are often overlooked. 
a. It is an accepted fact that some categories of fund managers (in technical terms 
active, non-quantitative, fundamental managers) depend upon meeting the 
management of companies on a regular basis in order to make informed 
investment decisions. This is often termed "corporate access" - (the making 
available of senior management to meet in person with fund managers). The 
author's own experience working on both sides of this process32 as well as 
currently running IIRF research suggests that this process is governed largely 
22, at 371 - 403. Also see Shleifer and Vishny, "A survey of Corporate Governance", The Journal of Finance, 1997, 
52 at 737-783 
3 1 Ingley and N.T. Van Der Walt, "Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest", 
Corporate Governance, 2004, 12, 4, at 535 
3 2 The author has worked in both Investor Relations, and currently, as a buy-side investment analyst regularly 
attending such meetings. 
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by corporate brokers and investment bankers, who collectively organise the 
vast majority of all meetings organised by these groups33 Access to 
management depends upon being a client of whichever broker is organising 
the meeting. Put more plainly, fund managers have to pay a non-independent 
third party for the privilege of meeting with the very people who they 
indirectly employ to run the companies that they own. This access is 
dependant not just on size, or even on ownership status, but is largely based on 
the amount you pay to the organising broker in terms of trading commissions. 
Fund Managers are therefore under a systemic pressure to trade high-volumes 
at high-commission rates in order to gain essential insights to outperform the 
rest of the market. This is in conflict with the interests of the client - namely 
paying low transaction costs and trading less frequently. Furthermore if access 
to management is limited, fund managers are also encouraged not to stir up too 
much trouble; if a fund manager asks questions that are a little too probing, or 
too awkward, not only can management refuse to answer them, the individual 
concerned could simply not be invited to the next set of meetings. The 
structure in place actively dissuades investors from playing too active a role as 
owners - for fear of being cut-off from the access to management on which 
they depend, not just with the company in question, but far more broadly. 
3 3 The IIRF is currently working on what the author believes to be the first piece of comprehensive research on the 
extent of the control of the corporate meeting process by corporate broking arms of investment banks. It is as of 
the date this thesis goes to print still unfinished and no firm results are available for reference to, however 
preliminary findings would seem to support this hypothesis. See http://www.iirf.org/research for further details. 
Other than this research there appears to be no documented evidence of this aspect of the authors argument, 
which must be taken into account when considering its' merit. 
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b. The free-rider problem : Fund managers also face a conflict of interest in terms 
of taking an active role as owners of companies they invest in. Whilst active 
involvement in companies has brought significant returns to some investors 
(well known examples include Erik Knight, of Knight Vine Asset Management 
and CalPERS34) there is a general disincentive to engage as active owners 
individually because of what is generally known as the free-rider problem. An 
activist will , whilst paying the full cost of his activism, receive only a small 
part of the benefits, as well as there being an equal and opposite disincentive to 
act because of an expectation that someone else will act instead. It becomes 
cheaper for a shareholder to sell-out (possibly justifying his actions by arguing 
that he is enabling the market for corporate control to take effect and that if 
the share price falls low enough the incumbent management will be replaced 
by takeover) than it is for an individual fund manager to take direct action 
against management. 
c. Even those self-proclaimed "activists" investors often engage in conflicted 
behaviour. Tom Donohue, CEO of the US Chamber of Commerce, has dubbed 
this "ugly...anti-value" activism. He sets out his thoughts in an article in 2006 
Equities magazine : 
A small minority of these investors spends a lot of time pressuring management to do things that 
are unethical, unnecessary and a value killer. Some push to take on lots of debt so the companies 
can pay special one-time dividends. Some press for spin-offs...Sometimes rumour campaigns are 
started that drive down stock value to benefit a very small number of abusive short holders.. .Not all 
3 4 CalPERS is an infamous U.S. pension fund, covering public employees in California - see "c" below. 
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proxy battles are created equal. Some are about value. But many times, proxy battles represent a 
power grab that hurts every other investor in the company. Here's a particularly glaring incident. In 
2004 CalPERS, the huge California public pension fund attacked Safeway, its chairman and two of 
its board members. At the time CalPERS said its sole concern was to eliminate conflicts of interest 
and improve corporate governance. But CalPERS had its own conflicts of interest. The chairman 
of Ca lPERS, at the time, was the chairman of the union that had that long strike against 
Safeway. And he lost his shirt because he didn't win. . . 3 5 [Author's emphasis] 
Furthermore, Monks has pointed out that many institutional investment 
firms have failed to act on behalf of their investors because they want to 
manage corporate pension money36. 
I f the managers manage a company pension fund, anything less than unquestioning support for that 
company's board may lead to loss of the business, since a majority of the trustees are usually 
directors or former directors of the company. I f the fund manager is part of a banking or financial 
services group, the company management may threaten to terminate banking or other 
relationships...But the most common agency problem arises from hind managers' own business 
interests. At any time some sponsoring companies of pension fund clients may be underperforming. 
Directors are unlikely to welcome shareholder activism from the manager. Even those doing well 
may be hostile to such activism as future discipline. 3 7 
It is clear that when fund managers are not independent actors, free from the 
same interrelated web of interests and activities that the rest of us have, that 
just like any other group that wields significant power with the potential to 
impact upon us all, they need monitoring. 
3 5 Tom Donohue, "The Good, The Bad and the Ugly!", Summer 2006 Equities Magazine, 4 2006, at 63 
3 6 Monks, cited in Gunther, 2002, supra. 
3 7 Modern Company Law, "Completing the Structure", 2000, at 72 
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1.2.5.2 Other market participants 
It has not just been the buy-side who have been responsible for "pointing the finger" in 
recent discussions on corporate governance. Whilst these groups of actors are not as 
relevant to this thesis, the following general observations should be noted: 
1) A large portion of buy-side investment managers are owned by large "bulge bracket" 
multi-function investment banks. Asset management functions are not only less 
glamorous but less profitable than advisory, capital markets and trading operations 
(to the extent that many have been selling their asset management functions). The 
interests and objectives of these other actors are widely conflictive with the interests 
of the asset management operations - particularly where the company in question is 
a client of the bank in question. Whilst banks theoretically have "Chinese walls" in 
place between the various functions, it is naive to assume that those on the asset 
management side do not come under conflicting pressures during the day to day 
course of their activity. 
2) This group of market participants do exert significant influence over buy-side 
managers, and because of their positions relative to those managers it is important 
that not only are the fund managers monitored to determine the extent of that 
effect, but the transaction-orientated market participants should also be carefully 
monitored. Because these participants are generally rewarded on a transactional 
basis (i.e. through transaction related advisory fees, transaction commissions or 
through the investing of proprietary stakes) we need to be particularly cautious. 
They are generally not interested in providing the best objective advice, but in 
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generating deal-flow or trading, and especially given the influence they hold over 
buy-side investment managers (for example through the provision of corporate 
access or investment research) a particular degree of caution is required, 
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1.2.6 Capital market participants are not merely the recipients of the benefits of corporate 
governance structures, but are independent actors with discrete sets of responsibilities 
and obligations. 
Discussions of corporate governance regularly focus on the enforcement of investors' 
rights. This is obviously a central issue. However, an analysis of the functioning of governance 
processes in isolation of the responsibilities or obligations of the providers of capital will be 
incomplete. There is a complex, and often contentious, matrix of legal, factual and competitive 
obligations and responsibilities that act to significantly affect the behaviour and motivations of 
investors - whether to each other, to ultimate beneficial owners (i.e. a unit trust fund manager 
to his subscribers), to legal bodies (i.e. money laundering reporting duties to the FSA or other 
body) and possibly obligations to society as a whole in common with the responsibilities of all 
other owners of property. In the same way as a detailed consideration of the rights investors 
currently enjoy is compared to the rights that, for reason of sound legal argument, one believes 
they should enjoy, so a proper discussion of this issue should include a comparison of the 
current obligations on investors and obligations that, for reason of sound legal argument, one 
believes they should have. In short one can divide these obligations into three categories 
1.2.6.1 Obligations to regulatory bodies. 
All investment managers are subject to reporting and behavioural duties to 
regulatory, standard setting or industry bodies in just the same way that other 
professional groups are. For example, in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, gives the FSA the power to administer and enforce the registration of companies 
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covering regulated activities, as well as giving it the power to de-authorise and fine 
authorised companies. The FSA has set out, in its conduct of business (see the FSA 
handbook for detail on the full C.O.B.) a series of guidelines which are considered best 
practice and followed by the majority of authorised firms at least in part. 
1.2.6.2 Obligations as fiduciaries or contractual obligations to best performance. 
The clear position, on full consideration of the evidence, is that active ownership 
combined with active investing is the key to consistent superior returns38. The Gordon Group 
reported that "A partnership catalyzing such activity...can expect to provide a return 
substantially above the baseline"39, and argue that such abnormal returns might, in 1992, 
have been in excess of 30%. Interventions do not even have to actually be successful to 
deliver returns40 and some commentators have argued that the mere act of observation can 
have a significant impact41. The impact does not have to be restricted to one or a small set of 
companies, as Stapledon sets out in some detail the positive impact that UK institutions have 
3 8 See Nesbitt, "Study Links Shareholder Proposals and Improved Stock Performance", Wilshire Associates, 1992, 
Nesbitt "Long Term Rewards from Corporate Governance", Wilshire Associates, 1994, Gordon & Pound, "Active 
Investing in the US Equity Market: Past Performance and Future Prospects", Gordon Group Inc., 1992, Jacobs 
"Break the Wall Street Rule", Addison-Wesley, 1993, "Audience with Bob Monks", LSE IR Insight Magazine, 2005, 
Bernard S. Black, "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: the Case for Institutional Voice", Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, Fall 1992, Michael T. Jacobs, "Short term America: The causes and cures of our 
business myopia", Harvard Business School Press, 1991, Michael E. Porter, "Capital choices: Changing the way 
America invests in Industry", Harvard Business School, 1992 
3 9 Gordon Group report, Ibid. 
4 0 See Nesbitt, "Long term rewards from Corporate Governance", Ibid. 
4 1 "Directors are like sub-atomic particles. They behave differently when observed", Nell Minows, quoted in 
Corporate Governance, Ibid, at 183 
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had on the UK system of corporate governance, and the ways in which this has resulted in 
value creation for those same institutions, in his paper on the subject in 199642. 
The key question should not now be whether they do, but why they do. James 
Downling explains that "The public funds now have so much money that they find it's harder 
to find new companies to invest in than to try and turn around poorly performing ones"". This 
explains this only in part - whilst the efficient market hypothesis has been largely discredited14, 
it is also the case that a large part of the problem is that the majority of assets in the market are 
reasonably priced - even in Graham and Dodd's day when the number of financial analysts was 
far smaller, they were quick to admit that suitable "margin of safety"45 investment 
opportunities were few and far between44. Forty years later, of course, this problem has been 
intensified as the number of analysts, professional and amateur, who are studying the market 
has significantly increased, and under-valued investment opportunities must logically be far 
fewer in number. Thus, it is immediately obvious that if under-valued companies are few and 
far between, and a pension fund manager needs divestment for risk-management purposes, he 
is going to be left with problems generating "alpha" returns. 
4 2 See Stapledon, "Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance", Oxford, 1996, chp. II-4. Also see L. E. 
Linaker, "The Institutional Investor—Investment from M&G's Viewpoint'" at HO. 
4 3 Monks & Minow, "Watching the Watchers", Cambridge, MA, 1996 at 120 
4 4 C.f. Graham, "The Intelligent Investor", 1973, New York, at 35!, 380. Also, Buffet, "The Superinvestors of 
Graham-and-Doddsville" 1984, published in Hermes, Magazine of Columbia Business School. 
4 5 i.e. Assets which the market was mis-pricing (specifically under pricing) by such a degree as to offer a sufficient 
margin of safety against, among other things, their own errors. 
4 6 Ibid at 351-352 
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Furthermore, there are generally considered to be very few institutional 
investors engaged in this "active" ownership47. This may in part explain why activism can 
deliver these returns. In fact, active investment has, on average, produced neutral or even in 
many cases negative returns, relative to the market over most historical periods one could 
care to measure. Ben Graham, in 1973, in his analysis of the performance of the mutual fund 
industry concluded that, whilst retail investors would probably have been better off investing 
in mutual funds than in individual stocks48, in general such funds did "no better than the 
market as a whole"49. Warren Buffet points out that [index funds] "are sure to beat the net 
results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment 
professionals"50. Lipper Inc. conducted research in 1998 that demonstrated the following out 
performance statistics : One year, 1,196 of 2,423 (48.9%), Three years, 1,157 of 1,944 (59.5%), 
Five years, 768 of 1,494 (51.4%), Ten years 227 of 728 (31.2%), Fifteen years 125 of 445 
(28.1%), Twenty years 37 of 248 (14.9%). These statistics are in gross terms - so fail to 
account for the reality that most funds charge "1.5% in operating expenses and 2% in trading 
costs"51, and fail to compensate for the "survivor bias" of funds - namely the trend that 
under-performing funds are generally closed or merged after one or more years. Also, 
4 7 "There not really much more than a dozen public pension funds involved... in fact if you took [a small number of 
funds] out of the equation...you might have very little activism at all", Regan, Quoted in "Watching the watches", 
supra, at 122 
4 8 "most likely his choice would have been between succumbing to the wiles of the doorbell ringing [mutual fund] 
salesman... [or the] much more dangerous peddlers of second and third rate...offerings", Graham, "The Intelligent 
Investor", 1973, 229 
4 9 Ibid at 229 - measured over five years and ten years, from 1961 and 1966, even the largest (and logically the 
funds that should be the best performing) the average performance was +- 10 basis points with either the S&P 500 
or the DJIA. 
5 0 http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/1996ar/1996.html 
5 1 Jason Zweig, comment on "The Intelligent Investor" (Ibid.) at 249 
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research has indicated that as small funds grow the chance of out-performance shrinks52. 
(This argument must be qualified, because active management of money is crucial to the 
efficient allocation of capital, thus the performance of the market as a whole is dependent to 
a certain degree on active managers. "As an investment strategy passive investing seeks to 
free-ride off the more or less efficient capital allocation of active fund managers"53 Investors 
in index-linked funds are "freeloading" onto the work of the active management industry by 
simply mirroring their behaviour as a whole and enjoying the benefits that they reap. This is, 
for obvious reasons, very hard to quantify, and does not change the substance of the 
argument that follows.) 
So if, as shown above, a pool of actively managed money quickly grows beyond the 
scale at which best returns can be generated by pure active investment, are money managers 
under any duty to act as active owners? The difficulty with this approach is that different 
classes of institutional investors manage different sized pools of money, with different 
resources, different objectives, different duties and different limitations. They vary from 
pension fund trustees (of a defined benefit fund) who have a clear set of fiduciary obligations 
with discrete and well defined capital requirements stretching out far into the future, to 
arbitrage focused hedge funds, who operate under strict mandates and are handsomely 
motivated by the terms of their own remuneration to achieve the best performance within 
strict behavioural limits. However, in general, all classes of institutional investors, operating 
5 2 Ibid at 248. 
5 3 The Myners Report, at 83, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/rnedia/2F9/02/31.pdf 
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outside of strict behaviour limiting mandates54, are interested in delivering the best 
performance to their clients or beneficiaries. I f it is true that the best performance can be 
achieved by exercising their rights as owners, then they should recognise this and alter their 
behaviour accordingly. However, all surveys of this matter show that, in general, the free-
rider problem creates a mis-pricing in the market for corporate control, such that most 
institutions do not correctly value their rights. This needs to be recognised and corrected.55 
The extent to which a legal duty lies on each category of manager depends on the nature of 
the pool of funds being managed, and a number of those management groups whose position 
is relatively clear in English law are covered below. 
1.2.6.2.1 Pension fund trustees have strict fiduciary duties to manage, or supervise, their assets 
in a conservative but wealth-maximising manner. 
There is significant case law on this subject in England and Wales, most relevant 
of which are Cowan v. Scargill56. Martin v. City of Edinburgh District Council57 and 
Bishop of Oxford v. Church Commissioners for England58, all of which generally 
exclude "ethical" factors from consideration (except in Church Commissioners where an 
exception was granted under circumstances of express provision being made in any trust 
deed), because of a fiduciary duty to focus on maximising the risk / reward balance of 
5 4 For example CSR or "ethical" funds, which are required to deliver performance only within the confines of 
objective (or subjective) ethical or socially responsible targets. 
5 5 See Nesbitt (second study), Ibid, where he demonstrates that, at CALPERS, a programme costing a mere $500, 
000 generated $137 million extra-ordinary (or above market) returns over 1992. 
5 6 [1985] 1 Ch 270; [1984] 2 All ER 750 
5 7 [1988] SLT329. 
5 8 [1992] 1 W L R 1241; [1993] 2 All ER 300. 
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the fund with a view to wealth maximisation. Similar case law exists in the US, for 
example see Board of Trustees of Employee Retirement System of the City of Baltimore 
v. Mayor and City Councillors of Baltimore59, where an exception was established only 
where the cost of "ethical" investing could be considered to be de minimis. Thus, whilst 
environmental, ethical and social concerns must generally speaking be put aside by 
pension fund trustees, their fiduciary duties thus extend to exercising their rights as 
owners in the interests of long term value maximisation. 
1.2.6.2.2 The insurance sector is governed in the UK by general company law, particularly 
under the Companies Act 2006, but more notably under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act [FSMA] 2000 (formerly via the Insurance Companies Act 1982). Fund 
managers working for the insurance sectors are arguably under the following sets of 
duties and obligations. 
1) Fiduciary duties of the directors to their shareholders of long term value 
maximisation. If, as argued above, fund managers will achieve best 
performance through a combination of efficient and skilful capital allocation 
and active ownership, then the directors are under a duty to ensure that their 
fund managers are behaving in the above manner. 
2) In addition, the insurance sector also has a separate set of legal obligations 
under the FSMA 2000 towards prudential management of assets to ensure 
adequate cover of policy holders' potential claims. Fund managers are 
5 9 562 A.2d 720 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1989) 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership - 28 -
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
therefore probably limited in the ways in which they can invest and engage 
in the above strategy of active engagement, if it can be seen to have the 
potential for either higher volatility or higher risk. 
1.2.6.2.3 Charity trustees are in a similar position to pension fund trustees. Charities are 
governed by the Charities Act 1993 and also by the Trustee Act 2000 in the course of 
their investments which supersedes the 1961 Act in its restrictions on investments. 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act sets out requirements for diversification (in recognition of 
modern portfolio theory) and requires trustees to carefully consider the suitability of 
asset classes and specific investments to the need of the trust. The charities 
commission has set out, in official guidance, that "the trustees must be particularly 
clear that their decisions will not place the charity at risk of significant financial 
detriment due to under performance by the preferred investments or by the 
exclusion from consideration of forms of investment to which the trustees are 
opposed"60. In other words, even where the substance of the charity is threatened by 
a specific class of investments, avoiding that class of asset or specific investment can 
only occur where there can be shown to be very careful consideration so that the 
financial interests of the trust will not be overly inhibited. 
1.2.6.2.4 Other investment institutions, such as professional fund management firms 
managing funds on mandate from trusts or pools of funds, unit trust or OEIC 
6 0 http://wv^.chariry-conimission.gov.uk/publications/ccl4.asp#p32 at section 36 
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managers or private cl ient f u n d managers, are generally under f iduciary obligations 
as managers o f beneficiaries funds : 
Fiduciary obligations rest upon any investor in a position of trusteeship, be it formal via the legal 
establishment of a trust (such as a pension fund) or simply by holding assets on behalf of others (as 
with a bank holding someone's deposits). The principal duties of fiduciaries arise under trust law, 
and are regulated for some categories of trustee under specific legislation, such as the Pensions Act 
1995. The general fiduciary obligations of a trustee (or someone in a position of trust) were set out 
by the Occupational Pension Board in a guide to the duties of trustees (OPB 1997). Beyond 
following the rules of the particular pension scheme in question and obeying the law, the general 
duties of trustees are 'To act prudently, conscientiously and honestly and with the utmost good faith; 
to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and strike a fair balance between the interests of 
different classes of beneficiary.' In principle these duties apply to all analogous situations such as 
life funds, investment trusts (where the 'beneficiaries' are shareholders), and unit trusts (where the 
beneficiaries are the unit holders).61 
The duty of fiduciaries to intervene i n the r u n n i n g of companies i n w h i c h they ho ld shares was 
tested in Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Company 6 2 , w h i c h restated the posi t ion he ld i n 
Speight v Gaunt 6 3 and Br igh tman J. distanced the court f r o m Re Lucking's W i l l Trusts 6 4 w i t h 
regard to board seats fo r major i ty shareholders, a l though acknowledged that a seat on the 
board w o u l d be one way to protect the beneficiaries' interests. I n Bartlett , Br ightman J. stated 
that: 
...the trustee was bound to act in relation to the shares and to the controlling position which they 
conferred, in the same manner as a prudent man of business. The prudent man of business w i l l act in 
such a manner as is necessary to safeguard his investment. He wil l do this in two ways. I f facts 
come to his knowledge which tell him that the company's affairs are not being conducted as they 
should be, or which put him on enquiry, he wi l l take appropriate action. Appropriate action wil l no 
6 1 Jonathan Charkham, and Anne Simpson, Fair Shares: The Future of Shareholder Power and Responsibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 141. 
6 2 1980, CD at Ch. 15 
"(1883)9 App Cas 1 
6 4 [1968] 1 W L R 8 6 6 (at 874) 
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doubt consist in the first instance of enquiry of and consultation with the directors, and in the last, 
but not unlikely resort, the convening of a general meeting to replace one or more directors. What 
the prudent man of business wi l l NOT do is content himself with the receipt of such information on 
the affairs of the company as a shareholder originally receives at annual general meetings. Since he 
has the power to do so, he wi l l go further and see that he has sufficient information to enable him to 
make a responsible decision from time to time, either to let matters proceed as they are proceeding, 
or to intervene i f he is dissatisfied... 6 5 
The posi t ion is thus reasonably clear. Not on ly do fiduciary duties give rise to an obl igat ion to 
take an active role i n the governance o f companies i n w h i c h the legal owners invest to protect 
the interests o f the beneficiaries, there is also a du ty to engage i n active ownership because o f 
the statistical l ike l ihood o f best performance. David Ball provides an excellent summary: 
When institutional investors don't vote, or vote without paying close attention to the implications of 
their vote for the ultimate value of their holdings, they are hurting not only themselves but also the 
beneficiaries of the funds they hold in trust.6 6 
1.2.6.3 A general legal duty to engage as active owners to society as a whole . 
To my mind there is no such thing as an innocent purchaser of stocks. It is entirely contrary, not 
only to our laws, but to what ought to be our whole attitude towards investment, that the person who 
has a chance of profit by going into an enterprise, or the chance of getting a larger return than he 
could get on a perfectly safe mortgage or bond - that he should have the change of gain without any 
responsibility... When a person buys stock in any of those organizations of doubtful validity and of 
doubtful practices, he is not innocent; he is guilty constructively by law and should be deemed so by 
the community and held up to a responsibility...Stock holders can not be innocent merely by reason 
of the fact that they have not personally had anything to do with the decision of questions arising in 
the conduct of the business. That they have personally selected gentlemen or given their proxies to 
select gentlemen of high standing in the community is not sufficient to relieve them from 
responsibility.6 7 
6 5 Surpa, at 63 at Ch. 15 
6 6 David George Ball, Former Head PWBA, quoted by the Investor Responsibility Research Center at 
http://www.irrc.org/company/12071999handbook.html 
6 7 Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, extract from "The public papers of Justice Louis D. Brandeis", 
Document 128 at 1146-91, 1911 
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In general, when considering the concept of private property, Monks and Minow highlight 
three aspects of property ownership common across all types of property68. Firstly, property 
ownership generally gives the right to uninhibited usage of said property according to the 
owners wishes. Secondly property ownership gives the rights to allow others to enjoy the 
property in whatsoever way the owner chooses to. Thirdly, the owner of property has the right 
to transfer and or divide the interest in said property as he chooses. Finally, property 
ownership also carries with it a responsibility to enjoy said property only so far as to not 
impact upon other individuals, such that the rights to enjoyment of property are limited by the 
concerns of society as a whole. Does this final limit apply in the context of security ownership? 
Berle and Means, in their seminal coverage of this question concluded that: 
. . . i f property is to become...liquid it must not only be separated from responsibility but it must 
become impersonal, like lago's purse: 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands'"69 
The contrast between these positions is clear. What, if any, of these responsibilities do the 
owners of securities have? However can this be stretched to a normative case for this general 
duty? Is there any evidence for such a duty already existing? Again, there is some debate on the 
subject, and this is not the place to reproduce much of it. The author's position is that 
shareholders owe no duty to society as a whole, and that this is clearly demonstrated in recent 
reviews on the subject of institutional ownership. The Myners report and the subsequent 
government paper both recommend action, albeit in different forms, that focused on the 
6 8 Corporate Governance, 3 , d Edition, at 98-99 
6 9 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, at 249,250 
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duties, fiduciary or otherwise, of an investor to underlying beneficiaries. For example the 
Myners report states: 
I f fund managers are truly to fu l f i l their duty of seeking to maximise value for their shareholders, 
then there wil l be times - certainly more than at present - when intervention is the right action to 
take. Of course there are many occasions when simply selling an entire holding is the appropriate 
response. But this is often difficult where holdings are large, where the share price is already 
depressed, or where a zero holding cannot be adopted for other reasons.. The case for action does 
not rest on a public interest argument about shareholder responsibility but on the basic duty 
of the manager to do their best for the client70. 
Not only does the Myners report not acknowledge the existence of a general duty, it 
explicitly argues that any case for action should depend not on the creation of a general 
duty but on the specific duty that already exists to funds' beneficiaries. The CLR's response 
proposed a requirement that managers disclose their voting records to trustees for the 
benefit of a pension funds beneficiaries71, not for the good of society as a whole. Clearly, i f 
a general duty existed then these reports would have merely recommended that such a 
duty was enforced, rather than focusing on the harder to enforce and specify duty to 
beneficiaries. 
7 0 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/2F9/02/31.pdf at p. 13, (this authors' emphasis). 
7 1 See the Final Report, I , paragraph 6.39, available as above 
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2 Section B - the importance of transparency of ownership. 
A company, its members and the public at large should be entitled to be informed promptly of the 
acquisition of...voting shares...in order that existing members and those dealing with the company 
may protect their interests and that the conduct of the affairs of the company is not prejudiced by 
uncertainty over those who may be in a position to influence or control the company.72 
Having set out the context of the market participant's role in corporate governance and their 
role in both monitoring of public companies and their duties to engage as active owners as well 
as active allocators of capital and having looked at the role of capital markets in this process, 
the next section of this thesis looks at the importance of transparency of ownership of 
securities in this process. It takes the three groups outlined in the Companies Act, the 
company, its members and the public, and examines each group in turn, wi th the aim of 
demonstrating not only that transparency of ownership is an essential precursor to satisfactory 
market transparency, but also that it has importance in its own. 
2.1 "A company" 
2.1.1 It has already been noted that a company, whilst a discrete legal person, has no 
interests of its own 7 3 . When one talks about the needs of a company to identify the 
owners of its securities (as opposed to talking about the needs of other owners, 
employees, or other stakeholders) the focus must be the appointed management of 
said company - appointed to look after the interests of the owners - and the board 
7 2 Department of Trade, Disclosure of Interests in Shares (1980) p.2. 
7 3 Supra., at 1.3.4 
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appointed to monitor the chosen management. There are two main elements of the 
need for a company to be able to identify the owners of its securities, firstly the need 
for owner-agent dialogue, and the second for regulatory and compliance purposes. 
2.1.2 The importance of "private" owner-agent dialogue - the managerial efficiency 
argument 
The major argument wi th in the context of owner-agent dialogue is that of 
managerial efficiency - because of limited management time it is important that market 
participants are transparent as to their holdings, both past and present, so as to be able 
to allocate rare management resources to the essential process of owner agent dialogue. 
It has already been noted that management are to run the company in the 
interests of shareholders, except under legally prescribed circumstances, specifically to 
maximise long term returns to equity 7 4. However, what form should this take? How 
should management go about maximising returns on equity? What degree of leverage 
should be used to maximise equity returns? Should management pursue acquisitions? Of 
what size? How should they be financed? Are shareholders wil l ing to suffer equity 
dilution in the course of pursuing these acquisitions - and should management hold 
back "cash" reserves (diluting equity returns and reducing dividend payouts) to provide 
a buffer, smooth dividend payouts and finance acquisitions or should cash be returned 
7 4 Supra., at 1.3.3. Return on Equity, or R.O.E. The author takes R.O.E. to be defined as either Net Margin x 
Inventory Turnover x Balance Sheet Leverage, or Net Income / Equity, both of which are mathematically 
equivalent (see James EngUsh, "Equity Analysis" at Chapter 3) 
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to shareholders? As Ryder & Register put it: "the company needs to know who owns its 
shares and the objectives75 of its owners"7 6. 
This is by no means a universally accepted position. For example, it has been 
argued that: 
The ability of fund managers to direct fundamental reform in corporate governance practice lies 
primarily with their control over investment capital. Such managers act as surrogate owners for the 
large block of individual shareholders they represent. They are therefore primarily concerned with 
firm performance rather than governance process and are less likely to intervene to change 
management procedures, preferring instead to exercise exit rather than voice when dissatisfied with 
company performance. As Margaret Blair 7 7 notes, activist investors that meet regularly with 
company management to review strategic and operational plans are in fact doing what the boards 
of directors are supposed to do, and such activism is not needed in properly governed 
companies. The formal activity of fund managers wil l likely be limited to motivating rather than 
directing corporate governance reform. [This authors' emphasis]78 
The author believes that activist owners have a permanent role to play in the 
governance of public companies that is not merely the result of systemic failures. The 
counter-argument to Blair's position can be divided into two. 
7 5 One can assume that the "objectives" of owners vary with time and size - in a listed company the objectives of 
any given set of owners may be considerably different from the objectives of the "Owners" as a body. 
7 6 Ryder & Register, "Investor Relations" (Random House Business Books, 1990) 
7 7 Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), p. 190. Quoted in Detomasi, citation given below. See also 
Margaret Blair, "Rethinking assumptions behind corporate governance", Gale Challenge, 1995 at p. 12 
7 8 David Detomasi, "International Institutions and the Case for Corporate Governance: Toward a Distributive 
Governance Framework?," Global Governance 8.4 (2002), Questia, 18 Sept. 2006 
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000600648>. 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership -36-
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
2.1.2.1 Firstly, the process of dialogue, monitoring and engagement wi th management alluded 
to above is of a fundamentally different nature than the regular business of a board by 
legal prescription. 
In both the UK and the US the powers available to shareholders are 
restricted (generally, excluding special resolutions in the UK) to matters outside 
of the course of ordinary business decisions. 
Shareholder rights are not unlimited, however, as the SEC only allows 'resolutions going beyond 
ordinary business which are therefore suitable subjects for shareholder review through the proxy 
process'. Probably the most high-profile SEC decision in this regard was over Cracker Barrel in 
1992. Cracker Barrel was a US store chain that was alleged to have a policy of not employing 
homosexuals. In 1992 the New York City Employee Retirement System attempted to file a 
shareholder resolution requesting the company 'to implement non-discriminatory policies relating to 
sexual orientation and to add explicit prohibitions against such discrimination to their corporate 
employment policy statement'. The SEC ruled that this was a 'personnel' matter, and as such was 
part of the 'ordinary business' of the company, meaning that the resolution could not be filed.79 
The position is similar in England and Wales, wi th resolutions falling wi th in the course 
of general business requiring a special resolution, where a company's articles follow Table A: 
...Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by the 
directors who may exercise all the powers of the company.80 [This authors' emphasis] 
Monitoring by activist investors is incapable of replacing monitoring by the board -
they do not have the same powers and exist to serve different purposes. It may be true that 
boards of directors are subject to both systemic and specific conflicts of interests and failures 
7 9 Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (New York: Wiley, 2002) 31 
8 0 Table A 1985 art. 70, superseded by s.19 of the Companies Act 2006 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership -37-
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
that may create an economic incentive for active investors to engage wi th company 
management - but that doesn't mean that "properly governed companies" do not need or 
would not benefit f rom active engagement with shareholders. 
2.1.2.2 Boards of directors are subject to systemic conflicts of interests and purposive 
complexities that leave them unable to satisfactorily complete their task of 
monitoring, reporting and governing without monitoring from shareholders, 
specifically from engagement wi th active investors. 
The author believes there to be essentially two parts to these objections, both of which 
are well stated by Monks and Minow, which is quoted liberally below. Firstly, boards 
are not independent. In general, this probably does not present too serious a problem. 
I f active involvement wi th outside shareholders can be relied upon to provide the 
independent monitoring required (given all of the provisos already mentioned wi th 
regard the independence of some of the bulge bracket banks' investment management 
divisions) - "Directors are picked because the CEO knows them...even those termed 
"outside" directors by the New York's Stock Exchanges definition...[many]...have 
some business or personal relationship with the CEO 8 1...a nice, cozy arrangement"82. 
The author does not necessarily believe this to be a serious problem - boards surely 
need to function as a cohesive group and foreknowledge of character, personality and 
experience probably gives a CEO or Chairman the ability to pick such a group. 
8 1 Monks is referring to ISS studies indicating that over 20% of so-called "independents" have quantifiable business 
relationships with the company or CEO. 
8 2 Robert Monks & Nell Minow, "Power and Accountability", 1933, HarperCollins, at 77 
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However, it is not a recipe for impartiality or objectivity - which does beg the 
question of whether any company w i l l ever have sufficiently adequate governance to 
eradicate the need for monitoring and engagement wi th active investors? Secondly, 
directors are often selected not as objective outsiders but highly skilled and 
experienced individuals, professionals or academics (even business journalists8 3), wi th 
the aim of bringing expertise and insight to a board's decision making and supervision: 
"Directors are not picked for their ability to challenge management. On the contrary, 
they are more often chosen for their business or personal ties, or for their ability to 
add symbolic luster"84. Monks concludes by reminding the reader that "since they are 
selected by management, paid by management, and - perhaps most importantly -
informed by management, it is easy for directors to become captive to management's 
perspective"85. Setting aside the issue of adequate information, these issues, whilst 
concerning, are not fatal, i f the outsider can rely on the actions of active owners to 
monitor both management and the board - providing an independent and objective 
review of performance, strategy and decision taking as well as issues falling within the 
broader governance context. 
8 3 See the announcement (FT, September 10 lh 2006) of FT journalist Lucy Kellaway's appointment to the board of 
Admiral Group pic. - http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/72e06188-40dc-lldb-827f-0000779e2340.html - although she 
herself does raise the question of her suitability by writing that : "After all, one of the more important tasks of a 
non-executive is to speak up if faced with an executive emperor wearing no clothes. And the story tells us who 
does that task best: a child" 
8 4 Monks, Supra., at 77 
8 5 Monks, Supra., at 78 
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Thus, having concluded that outside review and engagement by active investors 
is not s imply something that need take place on ly i n poor ly governed companies, bu t 
has a universal application to a l l public companies, the next key question to address is 
whether transparency of ownership is essential to effective dialogue and relationship 
bu i ld ing w i t h such owners. Before doing so, however, there is a more pressing 
question to discuss that must be addressed. 
2.1.2.3 Is this sort o f "private b r i e f ing" legal? I f not, should i t be? 
...dialogue between investors and corporate managers in listed companies is currently subject to: 
(a) criminal offences related to "insider dealing" and "misleading statements" which are mainly 
governed by the Criminal Justice Act 1993...(b) the new "market abuse" regime; and (c) the new 
regime covering "financial promotion", (the latter two are organised by the FSMA 2000). Moreover 
the FSA has recently announced that selective briefing is unfair, indicating its intention of pursuing 
listed companies that do not apply rules of fair disclosure.86 
The position in the US is now similarly unclear: 
With regulation FD, the commission is attempting to level the informational playing field by 
barring companies from releasing market-sensitive information to Wall Street insiders before 
announcing the news to the general public. Basically, corporations whose senior executives provide 
market-moving information to a few professionals must make the news public at the same time for 
intentional disclosures, or promptly for unintentional disclosures. The regulation is designed to 
address the problem of selective disclosure made to those who might buy or sell the stock based on 
the information or advise others to do so. (See "Highlights," JofA, Oct.00, page 8 and the SEC Web 
site, www.sec.gov.)8 7 
8 6 Ahmed Al-Hawamdeh and Ian Snaith, "Is 'Private Briefing' Illegal in the United Kingdom?", Corporate 
Governance, Blackwell, Volume 13, No. 4, 2005 at 489 
8 7 Ed McCarthy, "After Regulation FD: Talking to Your Constituents," Journal of Accountancy 191.2 (2001): 28 
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The legal question is surprisingly straightforward. I f analysts and fund managers 
view private or small group meetings wi th management as important (and show a 
distinct preference for private meetings), which they do, then they must see themselves 
as obtaining some sort of advantage f rom attending these meetings. I f they are obtaining 
some sort of competitive advantage, then private meetings fall foul of both the 
intentions of both sets of regulations of "levelling the playing field" for private 
investors. I f the information gained in these meetings is not price sensitive, then why 
would analysts continue attending these meetings (and why would investment banks 
continue to make large profits from corporate broking operations)? I f the information is 
price sensitive then it must be material and fall foul of both sets of regulations88. The 
counter-argument usually given is that the information conveyed in these meetings is of 
a "softer" kind, 
Investment managers should not seek to obtain price-sensitive information. This is because price-
sensitive information would, unless other measures were arranged...restrict institutional 
investors...ability to deal with shares...what investment managers and institutional investors aim to 
obtain is soft information. Soft information gives investors an edge over other market participants. 
Institutional investors...employ highly sophisticated financial analysts to monitor corporate 
managers, including taking part in dialogue with corporate managers, which is a costly process. 
Hence, it was suggested that the sophistication and skills of such analysts and investors allow them 
to mix public information with unpublished soft information. 8 9 
Coffee argues that such "soft" information "is desired by institutions that trade 
actively in order to outperform the market - in effect dumping shares i f the information 
8 8 C.f. S. 402 FSMA and M. Dickson, "The Clock is ticking as ground force meets the city", Financial Times, 5 l h 
May, 2001, at 13 
8 9 Al-Hawamdeh and Snaith, above, at 494 
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provided to it suggests a downturn in earnings that the market has not yet anticipated"9 0 
I f this view is correct, that "soft" information is merely unquantifiable unpublished 
material data, then as Eaglesham91 notes, the definition of soft information under the 
FSMA 2000 needs clarification. Either way, just because the only sort of information 
being exchanged in such private meetings is "soft", the information conveyed is no less 
material a concern than i f managers were engaging in wholesale selective briefing on 
plain financial or quantifiably "inside" data. The only real counter-argument is that 
both Coffee and Al-Hawamdeh have misunderstood the nature of the dialogue 
involved, and that the purpose of such meetings is different with a much less sinister 
form of information conveyance. One can argue this from two perspectives. Firstly, it 
can be argued that the information needs of sophisticated investors are different from 
the information needs of private investors92. This argument has some validity in the 
author's opinion - professional investors use complex valuation methodologies which 
require complex multi-period financial models. Producing these models requires 
detailed understanding of the financial impact of corporate strategy, macro-economic 
effects, and an in-depth understanding of the subject company's income, cash flows and 
balance sheets. The very nature of this process requires management "face time" to 
ensure accurate valuations and the dedicated time given to such investors and analysts is 
justifiable on this basis (to allow time for questioning management on fine details and to 
9 0 J. Coffee, "Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor", 1991, Columbia Law 
Review, 91(6), at 1277 
" J. Eaglesham, "The bright lights of regulation", 2001, FT, 12th November, at 18 
9 2 See D. Bence, K. Hapneshi and R. Hussey, "Examining Investment Information Sources for Sophisticated 
Investors Using Cluster Analysis", 1995, Analysis and Business Research, 26(1), 19-26 
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clarify writ ten guidance etc.). It is a somewhat weak argument, however, as there are a 
number of amateur investors who use similar methods but who are excluded from such 
meetings, and it fails to provide a justification for the more common "private" dialogue 
which the author is advocating93. The second counter-argument is that these private 
dialogues, aside from any monitoring and governance element, are more about enabling 
investors and analysts to make judgement calls and wi th management taking the 
opportunity to get their investors "on-side" with their plans. 
Unfortunately, both of these counter-arguments fail to deal wi th the underlying 
issue, which is that, even i f many other investors "not invited" would not benefit f rom 
attending, many who aren't invited would (not to mention the arbitrary fashion in 
which attendance at such meetings is decided, largely based on which broking f i rm 
institutions obtain research from). I f there is a benefit to be had from private briefing, 
under the reasoning of both the SEC and the FSA, it should be open to all - and carried 
to its logical conclusion all private briefing should be brought to a halt. However, A l -
Hawamdeh and Snaith argue that "restricting informal relations between institutional 
investors and companies does not seem to go in harmony wi th the Government's line of 
encouraging shareholders to make corporate managers accountable"94. Having 
considered the position of the legality of private briefing, and concluded that such 
briefings operate, at best, in a distinctly "grey" area legally, the next issue to address is 
9 3 There is, however, possibly a justification here on the basis of efficiency - typical analysts on the so-called "sell 
side" distribute their research to a large number of institutional investors, such that time spent with five or six 
analysts typically results in information flows to a far larger number of ultimate investors. Also, it could be argued 
that professional analysts are better placed to make use of face time because of their expertise and sophistication, in 
ways that private investors are not. Both of these additional arguments are somewhat weak. 
9 4 Ahmed Al-Hawamdeh and Ian Snaith, above, at 489 
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whether such a blurred position is advisable, and whether selective private briefing is in 
fact beneficial, not just to the individual participant, but to the market as a whole. 
1) Selective private briefing reduces price volatility 9 5 . This is largely self-
evident, both in terms of practical analysis and financial theory. C. 
Batchelor, in his article on this issue in 2002, covers the practical side of 
the discussion excellently: 
Critics of the new rales claim that far from improving the flow of information to shareholders, they 
will discourage full reporting and increase the volatility of share prices. They fear the new regime 
will add to red tape and cramp the informal relationships that allowed companies to guide City 
opinion and avoid sharp movements in share prices..."It is very difficult for a company like us that 
has had an open relationship with analysts," said Peter Tom, chief executive of Aggregate 
Industries, a building materials supplier..."There are fund managers and analysts who would phone 
to ask about the impact of the weather on trading or to ask if something another company was doing 
was relevant for us. We won't be able to have those conversations . . . It will shut down the flow of 
information."...William Underbill, a partner at Slaughter & May, the City law firm [says]..."When 
do you have enough information to make a forecast or disclose accounting irregularities? These 
things don't appear in a file on the chief executive's desk. They emerge in bits and pieces,"96 
Little needs adding to the above argument - communication without 
private briefing is likely to be "bitty", wi th the resulting increase in volatility. One 
does not, however, need to rely solely on practical concerns, as academic theory 
reinforces this concern. The relevant doctrine is known as the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis9 7 (EMH) : 
9 5 For further detail on why lowering price volatility is a good thing, see section 2.3.3 below 
9 6 Critics fear FSA curbs on market abuse wil l discourage full reporting and increase volatility, writes Charles 
Batchelor, ft.com site Jan 18, 2002 http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?id=020118007643 
9 7 Probably first used by E.F. Fama, see : Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: a 
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In finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are "efficient", 
or that prices on traded assets, e.g. stocks, bonds, or property, already reflect all known 
information and therefore are unbiased in the sense that they reflect the collective beliefs of all 
investors about future prospects.98 
Whilst there has been widespread discrediting of what is sometimes referred to as 
strong market efficiency", the general academic consensus tends towards a weak 
market efficiency theorem 1 0 0 - which means that whilst markets price securities 
fairly, most of the time, sentiment and human error can lead to systematic 
mispricing. Whichever view is taken it must be recognised that: 
no other theory in economics or finance generates more passionate discussion between its 
challengers and proponents. For example, noted Harvard financial economist Michael Jensen writes 
"there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it 
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis," while investment maven Peter Lynch claims "Efficient 
markets? That's a bunch of junk, crazy s tuf f ' 1 0 ' 
Nonetheless, one can rely on the general principles enshrined in the theory 
without embracing its fu l l implications. The basic tenet of EMH is that security 
prices ful ly discount all available information and market expectations. In other 
words, the price of any given share is generally nothing more than the discounted 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work." Journal of Finance, May 1970. Followed by : Fama, E.F., "Efficient Capital 
Markets: I I , " Journal of Finance, December 1991 & Fama, E.F, "Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and 
Behavioral Finance,"Journal of Financial Economics, September 1998 
9 8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efficient_market_hypothesis 
9 9 W. DeBondt and R. Thaler, "Does the Stock Market Overreact," Journal of Finance (July, 1985), Bernard V. and 
Thomas J.,' Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings,". 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305,1990. , Jegadeesh N and Titman S., 'Returns to buying winners and 
selling losers: implications for stock market efficiency," Journal of Finance 48:65-91, 1993. 
1 0 0 C.f. J. Lakonishok, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, "Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk," Journal of 
Finance, December, 1994. For an excellent summary of the existing literature see Clark, Jandik and Mandelker, 
"The Efficient Market Hypothesis", available at http://comp.uark.edu/~tjandik/papers/emh.pdf 
1 0 1 Clark, Jandik and Mandelker, above, at p. 1 
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present value o f the consensus f inancia l impact of a l l available news, data and 
i n f o r m a t i o n 1 0 2 . I t is on ly logical that i f i n f o r m a t i o n has to b u i l d up in to the sort o f 
blotches described above, then the price o f shares w i l l change sharply as news is 
released, rather than being t r i ck led out to the market th rough a smoother and more 
gradual process: 
...as companies wrestle with Regulation FD, two things wil l happen. First, they wil l decide not to 
disclose information that could be construed as either a warning or a prediction. This wi l l lead to 
bigger swings in their shares when they finally do make an announcement... in the case of Apple, its 
share fell more than 50 percent in one day as analysts said they were caught completely unaware. 
Now that's volatility. Second, in an effort to show they are disclosing more information, some 
companies wi l l trumpet minor stuff...The result could be more trivial press releases, less hard news, 
and more sudden warnings. That's a recipe for volatil i ty 1 0 3 
The clear i rony of course is that i n an environment w i t h h igh price vo la t i l i ty , i t is 
again the ind iv idua l investor w h o loses out, probably by much more than the inside 
i n fo rma t ion conveyed to inst i tut ions "cost" t hem - as i t is inst i tut ions w h o have 
been best placed to p ro f i t f r o m increasing price vo la t i l i ty th rough the adoption o f 
1 0 2 Although the Henry McVey, Chief U.S. Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley has found compelling evidence that 
prices do regularly depart from the present value of consensus expectations. He and his colleagues used a residual 
income valuation technique to model projected book values, earnings per share, dividends, and returns on equity 
using I.B.E.S. analyst consensus estimates for 7 years, and then projected a 5 year return on equity fade to long run 
(1986-2006) sector averages, generating valuations based on starting book values, projected present value of future 
projected supernormal profits, and a relatively small approximate terminal value (computed as the gap between 
costs of equity and historic sector averages - in his model generally less than 15% as opposed to DCF valuations 
where terminal values can be up to 75%). They then ran the model on the S&P 500 constituents and back tested to 
1996 (which generated over 100 basis points of annual market out-performance each year except 2000). The effect 
of the model is to approximate the net present value of consensus future expectations in such a way that even a 
weak form of EMH suggests that outperforming the market by following this form of purely quantitive process 
should be impossible. Regardless, even this sophisticated a model has some flaws which appear difficult to work 
around with a quantitive process. It is difficult to draw a firm conclusion from this process - but it does serve to 
call into at least some doubt the idea of Jensens (above at fh. 101) that EMH is a proven theorem. See "Intrinsic 
Value: A Safe Haven?", P. Gandhi 8t H. McVey,, Morgan Stanley U.S. Equity Research, April 2006. 
1 0 3 David Callaway, Executive Editor, CBS.MarketWatch.com "New SEC Rule a Boon to Investors But Expect More 
Volatility", www.prnewswire.com/financial/irreview/html/102300.shtml 
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short term trading practices that individual investors are unable to compete wi th 
due to inequalities in time, experience, training and available equipment. 
2) It is sometimes argued that because institutions and private investors share the 
same interests, and have the same underlying rights, the supposed "cost" borne by 
individual investors in allowing institutions privileged access can be effectively 
considered de minimis. 1 0 4 Surely, as all investors largely share the same interests1 0 5 
institutions are best placed to engage on behalf of all investors to further the owner's 
interests - and i f in the process of this engagement and dialogue they have to bear 
the costs of institutions gaining inside knowledge at their expense, do the two costs 
not balance out somewhat wi th the added benefit of reduced price volatility? 
2) Thurber goes even further in his analysis of the free-rider problem as it applies to 
institutional monitoring 1 0 6 . He strongly advocates a relaxation of the insider dealing 
rules to allow a modified insider dealing contract to exist between select institutions 
and companies - whereby institutions agree to adopt monitoring roles in exchange 
for access to inside information. Whether or not one agrees with the somewhat 
radical idea of contractualising such an arrangement, the argument that institutions 
should be rewarded for engaging in the monitoring process through continued 
access to management in these "private briefings" is fairly compelling. 
1 0 4 See Al-Hawamdeh, Ibid, at 495 
1 0 5 For the contrary argument that individuals and institutions often have very different objectives, see P. Coggan 
and N. Cohen, "A cautionary culture: Performance Pressures Faced by Fund Managers, Financial Times, 3 r d June 
1995 at 8 
1 0 6 S. Thurber, "The Insider Dealing Compensation Contract as an Inducement to Monitoring by Institutional 
Investors", George Mason University Law Review, 1, 119, 1994 
The problem of identifying beneficial share o wnership - 47 -
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
One can therefore conclude that whilst "private briefing" operates wi th in a grey area of 
the law, at least in the UK, but that there is a serious inconsistency between the stated 
legislative objectives of increasing institutional involvement in corporate governance and the 
recent restrictions on these private meetings. Furthermore, it can also be concluded that 
"private briefings" also bring net benefits to the market as a whole, reducing volatility and 
creating incentives for institutions to create long term relationships wi th the management of 
firms they invest in (as well as providing management wi th a useful forum for vital feedback 
on strategy and direction 1 0 7). The author, therefore, agrees wi th the conclusions of A l -
Hawamdeh and Snaith: 
In an ideal world, private briefing may be wrong. Yet the market is by no means perfect. Hence it is 
probably unwise to press against private briefing, arguing for more involvement of insignificant 
shareholders, when they themselves do not wish to be involved. Insignificant shareholders are not 
interested in the GM [General meeting] and therefore why would briefings...be any different? 
Analysts and institutions thrive on obtaining an information advantage. That would mean 
more monitoring of corporation managers and hence benefit for all, including insignificant 
• 108 
investors. 
2.1.3 Given that on-going dialogue between owner and agent is so important, is 
transparency of ownership a crucial part of such dialogue? Whilst the author believes 
that there are several reasons, arguably the most crucial is that management have 
limited time resources available and need a non-arbitrary way to allocate time to 
meetings wi th analysts and investors that ensures that the scarce resource of their 
1 0 7 C. Marston, "Investor relations meetings: Views of companies, Institutional Investors and Analysts", 1999, The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (http://www.icas.org.uk) 
1 0 8 Marston, above, at 502 
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t ime is best uti l ised. The author believes the on ly t r u l y fair and ef f ic ien t way o f such a 
divis ion is on the basis o f bo th vert ical and horizontal ownership transparency. There 
is a significant cost to management i n conduct ing these meetings : 
The companies were aware of costs and benefits when choosing to devote time and effort on 
communications with institutional shareholders and analysts. These costs and benefits included the 
purpose of the meeting and the circumstances facing the company. The companies operated in a 
competitive market for reputation and credibility in corporate communications... [they] had little 
choice but to have expensive corporate communications because they were not prepared to tolerate 
the perceived costs of poor communication. However, they did identify opportunities for economy 
and efficiency. These companies concentrated their corporate communications on core institutional 
shareholders and other influential parties. By restricting access in this way they sought to save on 
managerial time. 1 0 9 
Management t ime is extremely costly, argues Hol land, as i t is a h igh ly scarce commodi ty , and 
not l i m i t i n g thei r availabil i ty for private briefings may negatively impact corporate 
performance 1 1 0 . Marston concluded that, i f correct ly managed, the cost o f management 
meetings are w i t h i n reasonable l imi t s for most companies he surveyed 1 1 1 . I f the argument is 
that management t ime is l imi ted , but private dialogue w i t h long t e rm investors w h o are going 
to engage i n the mon i to r ing process has a h igh positive u t i l i t a r ian value, bo th i n terms o f 
governance, management accountabili ty, then i t is v i t a l that management have a way o f 
i d e n t i f y i n g not just the most suitable market participants to invest i n dialogue w i t h but more 
impor tan t ly an equitable method o f allocating thei r o w n t ime to the iden t i f i ed owners.. 
m J. Holland "Corporate Communication with Institutional Investors", 1997, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland, http://www.icas.org.uk/site/cms/contentviewarticle.asp?article=2295 also see J. Holland, 
"Private disclosure and Financial Reporting", Accounting and Business Research, 1998, 28(4), 258-269 
1 1 0 J. Holland, "Voluntary disclosure, Financial intermediaries and Market Efficiency", Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting, 1998, 25(1) at 29 
"' Marston, supra. 
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Ins t i tu t ional investors are also not a homogenous class and many inst i tut ions are not suitable 
candidates f o r the in t imate dialogue discussed above. Not on ly is a significant por t ion o f the 
available market index l i nked (Barclays Global Investors has more than £618 b i l l i o n i n index 
l inked equities a lone 1 1 2 ) , but a por t ion is also managed by pure ly quantitative active managers, 
w h o use purely mathematical screening processes to allocate hold ings" 3 . Management need to 
be able to i d e n t i f y s ignif icant shareholders and then el iminate those inst i tut ions w h i c h are not 
suitable candidates f o r the private b r i e f ing process. The process o f Investor "targeting", or 
i den t i f y ing w h i c h inst i tut ions are suitable candidates, and h o w p r i o r i t y should be assigned 
between d i f fe ren t individuals is h igh ly complicated. There are numerous commercial 
companies o f fe r ing such services (Georgeson Shareholder, DF K i n g and numerous others). The 
various methodologies used i n industry and a discussion o f the i r relative merits is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
2.1.4 Alongside the importance o f ongoing shareholder dialogue, ownership transparency is 
also v i t a l f o r the so-called market for corporate con t ro l to f u n c t i o n e f fec t ive ly . 1 1 4 The 
market fo r corporate cont ro l is thought to f u n c t i o n through price signals that create 
management incentives fo r performance th rough the threat of takeover 1 1 5 . I f 
1 1 2 http://www.barclaysglobal.com/about/what_sets_apart/indexing.jhtml 
1 1 3 Exactly how large this portion is would appear difficult to calculate - especially given the number of funds or 
managers using blended approaches, and the propensity of quantitative holders to use shorter term algorithms. 
1 1 4 Richard B. Higgins , "The Search for Corporate Strategic Credibility: Concepts and Cases in Global Strategy 
Communications", Quorum Books., Westport, CT. , 1996 Also see : David H. Downs, "The Value in Targeting 
Institutional Investors: Evidence from the Five-or-Fewer Rule Change.", Real Estate Economics. Volume: 26. Issue: 
4. , 1998. at 613 
1 , 5 Jensen, Michael C. and Ruback, Richard S., "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence". 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 5-50, 1983 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.corn/abstract=244158 
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i n fo rma t ion affects share prices 1 ' 6 , and, as already shown, effective communica t ion 
through private shareholder dialogue improves price vo la t i l i ty , then the market fo r 
corporate con t ro l w i l l f u n c t i o n more effect ively as an incentivisat ion process i f 
management are able to communicate effect ively w i t h the correct investors. 
Furthermore, management need to be able to use the private b r ie f ing process to 
defend themselves w h e n under threat of takeovers" 7 , and i t is l ike ly that the process 
w i l l be improved where an ongoing process o f dialogue leaves key investors, w h o 
w o u l d have to part w i t h their stakes i n the event o f a takeover, "onside" w i t h 
management's strategy 1 1 8 . Management also need to be able to re-approach capital 
markets fo r f u r t h e r f inancing needs and Watts and Z i m m e r m a n have shown the 
importance o f main ta in ing relationships w i t h significant investors i n meeting such 
fu tu re needs 1 1 9. 
2.1.5 Shareholder transparency, or a lack thereof, has a negative impact on the vo t ing 
process, creating financial and non-f inancia l disincentives for inst i tut ions to vote, and 
b l u r r i n g the key governance mechanism through systematic dysfunct ion . I n complex 
hold ing structures, w i t h split cont ro l rights, (see section C, below) improved 
shareholder transparency w o u l d greatly increase the ab i l i ty o f companies to i den t i fy 
" 6 Myron Scholes, "Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of 
Information on Share Prices." Journal of Business 45, Myron, 179-211. 
1 1 7 Frank H. Easterbrook, and Daniel R. Fischel. "Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' 
Welfare." The Business Lawyer 36, 1981, 1733-1750. 
1 , 8 See : A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy 
1986. , 94, 461-488. for the importance of large shareholders in context of takeovers. 
1 1 9 R. Watts and J. Zimmermanm "Positive Accounting Theory", 1986, Prentice Hall / Eaglewood cliffs (New 
Jersey). 
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the holder of the vo t ing rights, and pursue their votes. 1 2 0 This v iew is support by 
Davies, w h o argues: 
Clearly...the law is that if the custodian is a bare nominee for a beneficial owner, those rights 
should be exercised as the beneficial owner thinks best. In order to bring this about, however, the 
custodian must confer with the fund manager and perhaps, through the fund manager with the 
trustees. This may not prove to be possible within the notice period for the meeting. The difficulty 
would be alleviated if the company communicated directly with the beneficial owner.121 
2.1.5.1 Evidence that ownership structures impact upon ins t i tu t ional investor's incentive to 
vote 
There is some existing evidence that the complexi ty o f the vo t ing process is a significant 
disincentive to inst i tut ions not to vote, some o f w h i c h has been set out above. The diagram 
below shows the complexi ty o f the proxy vo t ing process. 
1 2 0 The proxy solicitation process is also one where having excellent knowledge of the shareholder base is essential 
: see Warren F. Greinenberger, Proxy Solicitation Process Developments in Shareholder Communication (1999 PLI 
O R D E R NON B0-006E), also see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law." 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 2: pp 395-427. 
1 2 1 Gower and Davies, Company Law, p. 342 
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reproduced from the 2005 summary report on voting practices,, below, at p. 7 
I n the same survey 1 2 2 along w i t h concluding that, of the participants surveyed, less than 1/3 o f 
the por t fo l io managers or senior analysts were actually involved i n the vot ing process, they also 
made the f o l l o w i n g key f indings: 
66% of institutions have no formal method of 
checking votes have been received correctly. 
76% of institutions believe votes are incorrectly 
registered, either "occasionally", or more often. 
Only 53% of companies meet with key 
institutions to discuss agenda items. 
73% of companies have never changed their 
strategy, policies or disclosure as a result of 
shareholder pressure. 
75% of issuers were dissatisfied with the level of 
voting participation and intended to increase it. 
The survey quoted an anonymous U K f u n d manager as saying: 
1 2 2 Survey of Global Voting Trends, Summary Report, 2005, DF King, at http://www.dfking.com 
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"Another key concern is the impossibility of keeping track of our votes. We have no way of 
knowing whether a company has received our vote unless we call them directly. We tend to conduct 
regular audits on a handful of stocks every year and try to follow our votes down their custodian, 
sub-custodian and registrar pipelines to cross check if our voting instructions have been 
processed and if companies have received our votes" Anonymous UK Fund Manager123 
The over r id ing theme o f the survey was that the complexi ty o f vo t ing was enormous, w i t h a 
substantial component o f the complexi ty arising f r o m the archaic web o f communica t ion lines 
between company and participants. Improved transparency of ownership w o u l d vastly 
improve this process. 
2.1.6 Less impor tant ly , i t is also possible that improved shareholder transparency could 
result i n lowered compliance costs fo r company management i n fields such as 
report ing and other corporate secretarial duties, as companies w o u l d be able to 
communicate d i rec t ly w i t h beneficial owners as opposed to nominees 1 2 4 . 
2.2 Inst i tut ions need themselves, and other inst i tut ions, to be transparent about their o w n 
holdings i n order fo r t hem to be able to f u n c t i o n as effect ive owners, (i.e. "Its members"). 
2.2.1 One o f the most significant obstacles to the correct market p r ic ing o f corporate 
con t ro l rights by inst i tut ions is the "free rider" p rob lem 1 2 5 , w h i c h has already been 
discussed. Noe argues, given that a large part o f the problem is w i d e l y diversif ied 
1 2 3 Ibid, at p. 17 
1 2 4 See transparency in context below for further details on the impact of current ownership structures on this, and 
other, issues. 
1 2 5 C.f. Robert Pozen, "Institutional investors: The reluctant activists.", Harvard Business Review, January-February 
1994, at 140-149. 
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owners are disincentivised to engage i n activism and moni to r ing , that the pool ing o f 
investors' interests by a signif icantly large g roup 1 2 6 , shows that a core group o f 
ins t i tu t ional investors w i t h the goal o f mon i to r ing the corporat ion and prevent ing 
managers f r o m engaging i n opportunism can natural ly develop under the U.S. 
structure o f corporate governance. Accord ing to Noe, ins t i tu t ional investors are 
motivated to mon i to r managers because they can gain f r o m the moni to r ing , despite 
the presence o f free-rider problems, costly moni to r ing , and a lack of any in i t i a l stake 
i n the corporat ion. 
...when insiders lack toehold stakes in the firm, concentrating holdings may actually lower share 
value. The logic behind this result is that concentrating wealth, although increasing the size of 
ownership positions and thus mitigating the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, also 
increases the adverse selection costs to noninstitutional investors. This lowers their demand for 
shares and thus further increases spreads'27. Through this process, concentration can lead to spreads 
so large that institutions cannot profitably acquire shares and monitor. In these cases, a profusion of 
small institutional investors produces more efficient monitoring than a single large monitor...[but] 
the lack of a toehold in the firm eliminates any incentive for institutions to monitor based on 
protecting their initial investment portfolio. Thus, the assumption mitigates against effective 
institutional monitoring. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, even in this case, institutional activism 
reduces agency costs. 1 2 8 
Thus, intra-part icipant transparency o f ownership could be used as a way o f pool ing 
ins t i tu t ional interests, compensating f o r the impact o f the free-rider problem and reducing 
1 2 6 T. Noe, "Institutional Activism and Financial Market Structure," Tulane University Working Paper, 1997 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=36569 
1 2 7 Note that the "spread", sometimes called the "bid-ask spread" is the difference between the highest offered bid 
for a block of shares and the lowest asking price for a block. As demand and supply imbalance grows, the spread 
widens raising dealing costs. Where demand and supply are balanced bid/ask spreads narrow. 
1 2 8 Ibid, at 5 
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the external costs of dispersed ownership. I t w o u l d a l low groups of inst i tut ions to far more 
easily place pressure on management and a l low fo r a more ef f ic ient governance and 
moni to r ing process. 
2.3 The public i n general, and more specifically the market, needs inst i tut ions to be 
transparent over the ownership o f shares i n order fo r the market to f u n c t i o n effect ively, 
(i.e. "The publ ic at large") 
2.3.1 Protection f r o m other owners - the take over context. The market as a who le to be 
transparent f o r peer to peer protect ion i n the takeover context. 
Shareholder disclosure provides stakeholders i n general w i t h a level o f peer to peer 1 2 9 
protect ion, specifically i n the context o f hostile takeovers. 
In Kuwait the need to decree [the] Law...on the disclosure of interests... appeared following 
a group of persons' shrouded and sly gathering of shares in a certain company during a limited 
period of time until the percentage of their shareholding amounted to a level which enabled them to 
change the Board. 1 3 0 
A n d r e w Collins argues, as part of a lobby ing e f fo r t to the EC regarding the upcoming 
transparency obligations d i rec t ive 1 3 1 , that 
129 " p e e r to Peer protection" can in this context be understood to mean the protection of shareholders from the 
potential transgressions of anonymous majority shareholders - through changes to board structure, articles and 
undervalued takeovers etc. 
1 3 0 Dr. Ahmed Al-Melhem, Comment on the Kuwaiti Law No. 2 of 1999 concerning the disclosure of interests in 
shares in the light of comparative laws, A.L.Q.. (2000), 221 
1 3 1 The transparency obligations directive, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/Iip/latest/doc/2003/com2003 0138en01.doc - thanks to the intervention by Chris Huhne, MEP, Articles 
9 and 10 have now been appended, amongst other changes lowering the mandatory declarable stake to 5% from 
10%. This is still some 3% higher than the lowest level across the ELF (Italy) 
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...transparency of ownership by means of the visibility of shareholdings on the register 
provides greater protection for a company and its shareholders: persons with visible interests can be 
identified and are less likely to "transgress" or disadvantage other shareholders132 
W h i l s t this argument pertains more generally to declarable stakes and systems o f mandatory 
disclosure, i t draws out t w o essential points. Firstly, that i t is a real benef i t to the body o f 
stakeholders as a who le to have a level o f transparency. This argument is best understood i n 
the takeover context, and i t is i n this area that the vast p ropor t ion o f case law has arisen 1 3 3 , 
where the clear f i n d i n g o f the court has always been that Section 212 notices must be 
responded to i n f u l l and i n a reasonable t i m e . 1 3 4 This demonstrates the courts ' understanding o f 
the importance of protect ing other shareholders f r o m 'stealthy takeovers' w h i c h seek to avoid 
paying the f u l l market value f o r the share purchases by concealing intent . Secondly, this 
argument also demonstrates the reali ty o f the purported "benefits o f rec iproc i ty" 1 3 5 , be it on ly 
one example o f such benefits - i.e. that the whole process o f transparency o f agency and 
ownership does not just confer normative benefits to the market, bu t that to each ind iv idua l 
shareholder there are clear, quantif iable and identif iable benefits - i n this case that o f 
protect ion f r o m other shareholders' "potential transgressions" 1 3 6. 
1 3 2 Anthony Collins, Appendix IV, Letter to the Financial Markets Commissioner, 4 l h September 2003 
1 3 3 cf. Re Bestwood [1989] BCLC 606, Re Lonrho [1988] BCLC 53, [1987] BCC 265 
1 3 4 There has on this been some academic comment, listed in the bibliography and in the introductory notes - it is 
however not relevant to the point at hand. What constitutes a "reasonable time" is not a point of substantive 
importance here. 
1 3 5 Anonymous fund manager, quoted in a presentation at a seminar entitled "Transparency of Ownership", 
attended by the author, London, January, 2004 
1 3 6 Andrew Collins, above 
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2.3.2 Transparency is essential to the operation o f the market as a whole . 
First, t ime ly and ef f ic ient communica t ion is essential to ef f ic ient markets, and this is 
recognised by most governments - hence the increasing legislative t r end towards the strict 
regulation o f market disclosure by companies. However, e f f ic ien t communica t ion w i t h the 
markets is clearly impossible w i t h o u t an accurate and up to date knowledge o f those markets. 
Whe the r or not one accepts the "Eff ic ien t Marke t Hypothesis" 1 3 7 i n its entirety, i t is impossible 
to argue that share prices could accurately reflect thei r net present values i f based on 
incomplete or out o f date in fo rmat ion . However , whi l s t u n i f o r m and t ime ly d is t r ibu t ion of, 
and at tent ion to, accurate in fo rma t ion migh t be the ideal, the absolute requirement for 
ef f ic ient markets is fo r i t to reach the most interested parties. The market therefore depends 
heavily on the abi l i ty of companies and thei r d is t r ibut ion networks to b u i l d up an accurate 
picture o f the markets - and part icularly o f the parties most interested i n any specific company, 
fo r the reasons already discussed above. 
2.3.3 Transparency o f ownership o f equities impacts upon the valuation o f equities -
ins t i tu t ional investors w o u l d benefi t f r o m improved transparency w i t h more stable 
and probably higher general levels o f valuations. 
2.3.3.1 The theory o f equity valuat ion 
I t w o u l d be incomplete to cover the issue o f the impact o f poor levels of transparency on the 
market w i t h o u t understanding h o w the market values securities. W e can classify valuation 
methods in to three dist inct groups: Discounted Cash Flow (and the d iv idend discount model), 
1 3 7 Covered supra. 
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Relative Ratio Analysis (common examples include the Price/Earnings and Enterprise Value 
/ E B I T D A ) and other discounting based valuation models (most commonly a residual income 
model 1 3 8 ) . English concludes that wh i l s t Discounted Cash F low may be the least w ide ly used 
(due to its complexi ty, t ime constraints and the requirement to b u i l d and maintain 
sophisticated mul t i -per iod f inanc ia l models i n order to predict fu tu re cash f lows as w e l l as the 
sensitivity i n the valuat ion to te rminal / perpetui ty assumptions), discounted cash flow remains 
"the most famil iar , and arguably, the most rigorous of equi ty valuat ion techniques" 1 3 9 . I t is 
therefore logical to focus p r imar i l y upon an analysis o f the discounted cash flow valuation 
technique. 
2.3.3.1.1 Discounted cash flow ( D C F ) valuation. 
As already stated, discounted cash f l o w is the most theoret ical ly rigorous method o f equity 
valuation. I t is based upon the no t ion that the value o f any given security is the present value 
o f al l fu tu re cash f lows accruing to i t . Calculating "Present Value" involved discounting fu tu re 
cash f lows at a risk-adjusted oppor tun i ty cost o f ownersh ip 1 4 0 . I t can be expressed 
mathematically: 
1 5 8 See "Applied Equity Analysis", James English, McGraw-Hill, 2000, Esp. Ch. 14, from 389. As a model, probably 
originally set out in "Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Depreciation", Econometrica, July 1938, 
219-241. Very similar in effect to the E V A model, originally published in "The Quest for Value", Harper Business, 
1991, Chapter 8. See "The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements", White, Sondhi & Fried, 3 r d Edition, 2003, at 
705-714 for a critical comparison and analysis. Valuation based on Discounted Economic Profits is also commonly 
used and should produce identical results (see Appendices for valuation examples), see Copeland et. Al , supra, at 
149. The whole principle of economic profits & discounted earnings can be traced all the way back to Alfred 
Marshall in 1890, see: "Principles of Economics", Vol. 1, MacMillan & Co., 1890 at 142. 
1 3 9 Ibid, at 289 
1 4 0 See Robert F. Reilly and Robert P. Schweihs, The Handbook of Business Valutations, Mc-Graw Hill, New York, 
2000, esp. p. 331 onwards. Also see Palepu, Bernard & Healy, Introduction to Business Analysis & Valuation, South 
Western College Publishing, Ohio, 1996, Ch. 6 
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,, , . v i (Cash f l ow to equity). 
Value o f equity = > — — L 1 ± -
r (! + *)' 
W h e r e Jc is the risk-adjusted oppor tun i ty cost o f equity (or the "risk adjusted discount rate" 1 4 1 ) . 
The most usual f o r m for setting Jc is under the Capital Asset Pr ic ing M o d e l ( C A P M ) where the 
cost o f equity can be expressed as: 
Cost o f equity = risk - free rate + (/? * equity market premium) 
W h e r e the beta ( P ) is the sensit ivity o f the ind iv idua l stock relative to the market as a w h o l e 1 4 2 
thus: 
p _ Covariance(BenchmarkRerurns,Selectedstock returns) 
Variance(Benchmark Returns) 
W h a t these equations te l l us is that the value o f a security today depends at least i n part on the 
historical f luctuations o f that security relative to the market. So i n the case o f t w o securities, 
where both have the same levels of anticipated cash f lows accruing to them, if one's historical 
returns have varied more sharply from the market rate of return than the other, then it will be 
valued lower. I t has already been demonstrated that a fai lure to communicate w i t h a 
company's shareholders results i n wider f luctuations i n market price than a company that is 
effect ively communicat ing w i t h its shareholders; W e can n o w extend this conclusion by 
1 4 1 Simon Benninga, Financial Modeling, 2ni Ed. The MIT Press, 2000 at p.31 
1 4 2 CAPM, and by extension, B, is one of the most frequently attacked cornerstones of theoretical equity valuation. 
For one, p, should be used prospectively not retrospectively, and analysis has suggested that there is only a 45% 
correlation between historic and prospective P's, see "The Association between market-determined and 
accounting-determined measures of systematic risk: some further evidence", W. Beaver and J. Manegold, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitive Analysis, June 1975, at 231-284. However, for the purposes of this text we will assume 
C A P M as it applies to approximating the risk / opportunity cost of equity capital to be theoretically sound, if only 
because of the fact that it continues to be so widely used despite the academic and professional (notably Warren 
Buffet) criticism it has received. 
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stating that poor transparency impacts negatively on ind iv idua l share price valuations, raises a 
company's cost o f capital, and w i l l also h inder long t e rm returns on equity by raising 
management's threshold f o r fu tu re investments where investment net present value analysis is 
used to evaluate capital projects. 
2.3.3.2 Market valuation 
Cont inu ing w i t h the theme o f the impact o f transparency on the process o f equity 
valuations, the next question that must be asked is h o w knowledge by one analyst / investor o f 
w h o the other analysts / investors are impacts upon their ind iv idua l assessment o f a share 
price's fu tu re value. There is therefore a d is t inct ion - whereas i n the previous section we were 
concerned w i t h the impact of transparency on the fundamenta l value o f a company (i.e. its 
absolute w o r t h ) , now we are concerned w i t h a fu tu re market valuation - or what ind iv idua l 
market players estimate to be the price another ind iv idua l i n the market w i l l be prepared to 
pay at some point i n the fu ture . I t can be argued that k n o w i n g w h o the current owners of any 
given security are impacts upon the price that a market ind iv idua l estimates that security to be 
w o r t h , and affects the estimate that a current owner believes the security to be w o r t h at some 
po in t i n the fu ture . The argument is somewhat nebulous, and other than by in te rv iewing a 
significant number of market participants (a study that w o u l d be p roh ib i t ive ly t ime consuming 
given current l imitat ions) the on ly way to address this w o u l d be by way o f a number o f 
hypothet ical examples: 
1) Company B, w i t h acquisitive intent , holds a 0.5% stake i n company A . There 
are clearly a number o f ways i n w h i c h this might impact upon the 
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investment valuat ion of any given firm - applying a takeover p r emium to the 
valuation as w e l l as reduced l iqu id i ty i n smaller capitalised companies. 
2) Company B, an activist hedge f u n d intent on bu l ly ing management in to 
releasing a significant amount o f retained cash to shareholders or re-
leveraging the f i rms balance sheet, holds a 0.5% stake i n company A . W h a t 
impact w o u l d this have? W h a t about k n o w i n g that companies C, D , and E 
h o l d between them some 35% and are closely al l ied i n aims to company B? 
I n case of fact, wha t i f the 3 r d party investor, ho ld ing 0.5% o f the London 
Stock Exchange k n e w T C I held a significant part o f the Deutsche Bourse and 
knew its in ten t? 1 4 3 W h a t impact w o u l d that have had on his estimate of the 
fu tu re value of the London Stock Exchange's shares? 
3) Company B holds 25% of Company A and is a long te rm strategic investor. 
W h a t impact does k n o w i n g Company B holds this stake have upon your 
fu tu re estimate o f the value o f company A - given that the l i qu id i ty of 
company A's shares is effect ively reduced by 25%? 
4) Company A's share price has dropped 25% i n the past 6 months. 40% of the 
shares are n o w owned by hedge funds. W h a t impact w o u l d i t have on our 3 r d 
party to k n o w that company B, a long on ly pension f u n d w i t h a strong value 
bias, w h o previously owned 0.25% o f company A , has recently bought a 
0.5% stake? 
1 4 3 See http://wvw.ftmandate.com/news 
fire_in_battle_for_London_Stock_Exchange.htm] 
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These hypothet ical questions do not conclusively prove, and can not conclusively 
prove, that transparency o f ownership impacts upon equity valuations, but they do 
demonstrate that to one investor, k n o w i n g w h o another investor is, or is not, may impact upon 
an estimate of the fu ture value o f the company. Obviously, i f one extrapolates the effect o f 
changes to an individuals fu tu re estimates to the market as a whole , the impact o f these effects 
could be quite considerable. 
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2.3.4 The arguments above do need to be qual i f ied however. There is a f inancial cost of 
transparency that cannot be ignored and must be taken into account w h e n 
considering the adequacy o f existing regimes. This subject cannot be considered in 
isolation f r o m f o l l o w i n g sections of this thesis - to understand f u l l y w h y transparency 
has a financial cost, one must understand the complexi ty bo th of ho ld ing structures 
and also o f the in ternal complications fo r each ins t i tu t ion (i.e. the reali ty that 
d i f ferent pots of money are managed by ent i re ly separate managers, w i t h d i f fe ren t 
sets of short and long t e rm objectives may at the same t ime be buy ing shares i n one 
company at the same t ime as the other is selling them. The same ins t i tu t ion , w i t h 
d i f fe ren t sets o f objectives could conceivably vote i n t w o opposing ways - as their 
d i f f e r i n g objectives lead them to d i f fe ren t conclusions. 
The f u n d management c o m m u n i t y w o u l d be quick to assert that these costs are very 
real . 1 4 4 The administrative burden o f calculating net holdings as percentages 1 4 5 o f market 
values, inc lud ing calculations aggregated over a complex ne twork o f management contracts, 
combined w i t h the con t inu ing need to respond to s.212 le t ters 1 4 6 is an essential concern 1 4 7 . 
1 4 4 C.f. comments by Gemma Kingsley, Fund Manager, Newton, presentation given, 2004, at the IIRF conference 
Zurich, available at www.iirf.org/conferences/2004zurich/presentations 
1 4 5 See sections on declarable stakes, below. 
1 4 6 Even registrars operating designated accounts still estimate receipt of some 50 s. 212 letters each day - Hugh 
Gibson, HSBC Global Investor Services, quoted in "Seminar on transparency of ownership", Jan 2004, attended by 
author. 
1 4 7 Though objections on the ground of technological developments may prevail or at least propitiate such 
arguments. 
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2.3.4.1 The cost of research and investment innovation. 
There is a second major aspect of the cost of transparency; institutional investors invest a large 
amount of time and money into their investment decisions. In a similar way to companies' investments 
in research and development, institutions research investment decisions - and come up with original 
insights into the relative valuations of their potential investments. The second cost of transparency is 
therefore that institutions are not able to protect their 'intellectual property' from other investors. This 
argument must in turn be qualified in three ways. 
2.3.4.1.1 The value added of conventional equity research is probably limited, given concerns 
expressed above as to the possibility of genuine market out-performance by institutions 
solely involved in active investing. 
2.3.4.1.2 Given this, merely knowing the content of other institutions' portfolios does not destroy the 
vast portion of the value created by that institution in conducting their own research. There 
are two sides to this argument. On the one hand, no one fund management house has a 
perfect track record with every single investment. Merely knowing that a particular house 
has invested a certain amount in a certain company does not reveal the full value of their 
research. A time delay would also make a substantial impact on this aspect of the cost of 
transparency - it is not so much that the returns on investment are short term (i.e. there is 
only a benefit to be had in an investment institutions" research in the short term), but that 
the market, and the company itself, are fluid organisms - and the investment case will 
change substantially over, for example, a three month period. 
2.3.4.1.3 Disclosure of holdings to the company itself would not incur this cost. As demonstrated in 
the earlier part of this section - some of the most urgent reasons for transparency relate to a 
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company being able to identify who its shareholders are. The author, in his proposed 
benchmark below, argues for differentiated disclosure, whereby the public as a whole would 
be able to receive different sets of information from the company, negating a large part of 
this cost to the institutions involved. 
2.3.5 Accountability to the market 
The final justification is that there is a requirement that institutions exercise of their 
duties both as owners of public corporations and as managers of another person's funds. 
2.3.5.1 I f public companies exert significant influence over society as a whole, and we believe 
that the owners of public companies play a vital role in the process of governing these 
companies and holding them to account, as set out in section A, then the public as a 
whole has a justifiable interest in knowing how the duties of the persons nominated, 
largely by society as a whole through the allocation of investment funds, exercise this 
duty. It is only logical that to hold these owners to account society needs to be able to 
identify which companies they have invested in, and how they have exercised the 
rights attaching to ownership of parts of these firms. Opacity of ownership renders the 
accountability mechanisms between beneficiary and fiduciary inoperable and presents 
a significant barrier to market participant accountability, negating the benefits set out 
under section A, above. 
2.4 The holders of other securities 
So far in this thesis the author has chosen to focus on the holders of equity instruments, 
primarily institutional investors. There are two other classes of instrument that need to be 
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considered before proceeding further. The first of these groups is derivative instruments, 
which are derived from either equity or debt instruments otherwise traded in the market 
(other forms of derivates, be they currency, commodity, shipping, etc. are obviously not 
relevant). The author believes that consideration of these instruments should lie outside of 
the scope of this thesis - whilst they are most commonly used by the least accountable of 
market participants - hedge funds - they rarely carry voting rights and are very frequently 
traded, making their identification very difficult and their impact and relevance in the 
context of governance very limited. Furthermore, they are an extremely complex and 
technical category of instruments, and their explanation would occupy significant time and 
space, particularly given the impersonal nature of many "split" derivatives, where different 
characteristics of the same instrument are separated and then sold on to different owners. 
The second category of instrument not yet considered is debt instruments, and the author 
believes these to be far more relevant. 
2.4.1 Debt instruments & creditors 
2.4.1.1 What are they? 
In this section we are concerned with two distinct categories of debt. The first is 
financing through bank loans, or other forms of direct, illiquid and personal financing. 
This varies in complexity f rom straight forward overdraft facilities to complex 
syndicated loans and interest-swap facilities. The central issue here is the essentially 
stable nature of the creditor's identity (the debt is generally not bought and sold wi th 
any regularity, thus is held by one or more lenders for a relatively long period of time). 
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The second category is tradable debt instruments. In this category the author includes 
commercial paper and bonds (including convertible bonds). Also in this category the 
author considers preferred shares (as fixed interest and generally non-voting 
instruments even though technically an equity instrument) and hybrid securities 
(debt/equity hybrids treated as debt by governments for tax purposes and equity by 
rating agencies for the purpose of calculating credit ratings - strictly speaking preferred 
shares fall wi th in this category). 
2.4.1.2 What control or influence do they exert over companies? 
Creditors, whether specific direct creditors or the market in general, through the 
ownership of bonds or other tradable debt instruments can exert as much influence 
over companies' management. This is particularly true of individual large creditors, 
such as banks, who have a significant interest in seeing returns on their investments. A 
large part of their power derives from control rights that attach to "covenants" attaching 
to the debt in question. 1 4 8 Covenants generally require the borrower to adhere to certain 
conditions, for example the maintenance of certain proportions of assets. I f the 
borrower breaches these conditions, then the lender gains rights to take certain actions 
for example seizing certain assets. Furthermore, both financial lending institutions and 
the debt markets exert significant control over companies because of a continuing need 
to refinance, "As a result of having a whole range of controls, large creditors combine 
substantial cash f low rights wi th the ability to interfere in the major decisions of the 
1 4 8 See Smith, Clifford and Warner, 1979, "On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants", Journal of 
Financial Economics, 7, 117-161 
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firm".149 This control can have serious negative impacts on long term returns to 
shareholders - existing covenants may prevent future investment 1 5 0 and the negotiated 
power of major creditors may force inefficient liquidation, particularly when much of 
the value of the firm lies in future growth 1 5 1 . Whilst there has been some academic 
discussion on the theoretical role that creditors have to play in corporate governance152, 
there is only limited empirical evidence. However, it has been noted that in Japan, firms 
wi th a "principal banking relationship" have significantly higher levels of board 
turnover whilst underperforming than those who do not 1 5 3 . Furthermore, in Germany 
there is some evidence that financing banks (also holding equity) are significantly more 
effective at improving management performance than other blockholders1 5 4. Individual 
cases have been documented of the role specific fixed income investors have played in 
corporate governance155. In all cases, however, the impact that creditors have on 
corporate governance is limited by the legal measures in place in each country and is 
, 4 9 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "A survey of Corporate Governance", The Journal of Finance, LII No. 2, 
June 1997 
1 5 0 See Hart and Moore, 1995, "A theory of debt based on the inaliability of human capital", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109, 841-879. 
1 5 1 See Diamond, 1991, "Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk", Quarterly Journal of Economics Studies, 106, 
1027-1054. 
1 5 2 C.f. Grossman-Hart, 1986, "The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration", 
The Economics of Information and Uncertainty (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). Townsend, 1978, "Optimal 
contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification", Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-
293.Hellwig, 1985, "Banking and finance at the end of the twentieth century", Wirtschaftswissenschaftlich.es 
Zentrum discussion paper No. 9426, University of Basel. 
1 5 3 See Kaplan and Minton, 1994, "Appointment of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for 
management", Journal of Financial Economics, 36, 225-257 and Kan and Shivdasani, 1995, "Firm performance, 
corporate governance and top executive turnover in Japan", Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 29-58. 
1 5 4 Gorton and Schmid, 1996, "Universal banking and the performance of German firms, Working Paper 5453, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA, USA. 
1 5 5 See Gilson and Stuart, 1990, "Bankruptcy, boards, banks and block holders, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 
355-387 and GUson, Stuart, Kose John and Larry Lang, 1990, "Troubled debt restructurings: an empirical study of 
private reorganisation of firms in default", Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 315-355 
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dependent on cultural issues156. In general, the legal protection offered to creditors 
exceeds that of shareholders (debt being more "senior" in corporate finance terms than 
equity). In addition, creditors have individual rights of action against a company for 
payment in ways that shareholders do not - making them even more important to 
identify as individuals. 
In conclusion, creditors can exert significant influence, both directly and indirectly over 
a company's management. It is essential that we are able to identify who a company's 
creditors are, both in terms of tradable debt instruments and direct creditors. 
Additionally, the problems that commonly occur when companies need to renegotiate 
debt held by a large number of dispersed creditors (i.e. where there are a large number 
of small creditors it is harder to renegotiate in the face of bankruptcy or default than 
where there are a small number of large creditors 1 5 7) may be more easily overcome 
when the creditors can be easily identified and communicated with - so the interests of 
shareholders may be protected in the long run by a company's ability to identify and 
communicate wi th holders of traded debt to prevent liquidation at times of cash f low or 
funding crises. Their holders' accountability and identification is therefore as critical as 
the holders of equity instruments. 
1 5 6 For example, in Germany and Japan large banks exert significant influence because of both block holdings and 
board positions. For a discussion on the legal regime in Italy and its impact on creditors role in corporate 
governance see Fabrizo Barca, 1995, "On corporate governance in Italy : Issues, facts and agency", manuscript 
available from the Bank of Italy, Rome, quoted in Shleifer and Vishny, above. 
1 5 7 See Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991, "A theory of workouts and the effects of reoganisation law", Journal of 
Finance 46, 1189 - 1222 and Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996, "A theory of predication based on agency problems in 
financial contracting", American Economic Review, 80, 94-106. 
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2.4.2 Hybrid securities 
The distinction between equity and debt instruments is becoming further blurred by 
the (re) emergence of blended equity and debt instruments that are often referred to as 
"hybrid" securities (also called "Dequity"). These instruments are rising in popularity 
primarily because of their capacity to be treated as debt by tax authorities (thus making 
coupon payments to security holders tax deductible) but allowing rating agencies to 
treat the securities as equity (with the corresponding effect on credit ratings). They 
have significance to this thesis however, primarily because of the holders' capacity to 
exert, potentially, far greater impact on the company than either debt or equity holders 
individually: 
W i t h dequity, however, the investors can provide safeguards to protect their interests. 
W i t h dequity, an investor has more than a vote at the annual meeting as a means of 
directly influencing management action. 
With [hybrids], however, the investors can provide safeguards to protect their interests. With 
dequity, an investor has more than a vote at the annual meeting as a means of directly influencing 
management action...Investors can use dequity creatively when they want to impose restrictions on 
management discretion but at the same time want to specify conditions under which the constraints 
are automatically lifted or provide themselves with the means to make such choices under 
prespecified [sic] conditions. Therefore, the creation of dequity in all its varieties can involve a 
great deal more than merely creating a tax dodge, although it sometimes is just that. Dequity can 
also be more than a means for solving case-specific problems, although it is also sometimes just 
that, as well. In the broader sense, dequity can be the mechanism for defining new forms of business 
organization that are very different from the traditional corporation.158 
1 5 8 Andrew H. Chen, and John W. Kensinger, Innovations in Dequity Financing (New York: Quorum Books, 1991) 
6 
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The process of identifying such instruments is generally equivalent to that used to identify debt 
holders, as the two shall be treated together for the remainder of this thesis. 
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3 Section C - transparency in context: structural concerns 
Sections A and B, above, highlight some of the reasons why transparency of securities 
ownership is an important concern, specifically as part of the governance framework. This 
section sets out four structural and practical observations that impact on the ongoing 
discussion. 
3.1 A statistical regression analysis of institutional ownership of the S&P 500 1 5 9 
The first and second of these observations can only be proved by reference to real world 
data on institutional ownership patterns. Other than the most general observations about 
ownership levels1 6 0, it is very difficult to obtain good quality ownership data that can be 
rigorously analysed, because of the lack of a comprehensive top-down transparency regime 
in many countries, including the UK. However, the US 13-F system does allow this sort of 
analysis for US institutions' holdings in US companies, for reasons that w i l l be discussed in 
detail below. The author recognises that this thesis is focused on the UK and that the 
inclusion of foreign ownership data only provides limited analytical support. However, in 
other ways the structure of institutional ownership in the UK and the US can be 
characterised as similar in a superficial sense, and there is a high chance that analytical 
insight f rom a US focus can be applied to the UK market in a limited way. 
In order, therefore, to analyse institutional ownership patterns as they apply to 
transparency of ownership, a regression analysis of EDGAR (i.e. 13-F obtained) holding 
1 5 9 Data provided by Reuters, correct as of 13 t h February 2007 
1 6 0 Such as those set out in the DTI study referred to above 
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data has been performed by the author, using EDGAR data sourced from Reuters, which 
has revealed two key findings 1 6 1 . 
3.1.1 The US market is categorised by a high level of institutional ownership in general, and 
individual institutional stakes are generally small relative to declarable stake levels in 
jurisdictions that have them 1 6 2 
Institutional ownership of U.S. firms 
20 40 60 80 100 
Percent owned by Institutions 
Figure 3.1.1.A 
3.1.2 Figure 3.1.1.A, above, shows the top down institutional ownership levels for the S&P 
500, broken up by market cap. A statistical regression on the same data gives an R 2 1 6 3 
of 0.06 which indicates that wi thin the S&P 500 ownership levels are not related to 
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1 6 1 Al l graphs and regression conclusions are therefore the sole work of the author based on his own analysis. Data 
is correct as of 13 t h February 2007. 
1 6 2 The concept of "declararable stakes", which is a key one when discussing transparency of ownership, is 
discussed in detail below. For the purposes of this analysis, they can be summarised as regulatory devices that 
trigger mandatory disclosure of a person's holding when it reaches a certain size relative to the size of the company 
invested in (generally at a level between 1 and 5 percent). 
1 6 3 R squared is a measure of "fit" of a proposed linear statistical model. It is more formally referred to as the 
"coefficient of determination". For further details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coefficient of determination , 
where the formal definition is given as "the proportion of variability in a data set that is accounted for by a 
statistical model". 
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market capitalisation. The average ownership level for the S&P 500 is approximately 
75%, wi th the majority of firms being between 60% and 80% owned by 13-F 
compliant institutions. Institutions, therefore, predictably represent extremely 
important "players" in the transparency debate - far greater than so-called "retail" 
owners (i.e. private individuals). These same institutions generally take what could be 
classified as objectively large, but relatively small, stakes in the firms they invest in : 
Institutional Ownership Stakes (by frequency) 
70 -| . j 
Average approximate institutional holding sizes (calculated by taking the total 
institutional ownership figure and dividing by the number of institutional holders) are 
approximately normally distributed, around the median of 0.075%. The lowest declarable stake 
level, as shown in section 4 below, is 1%, wi th many countries having minimum levels at 3% or 
even 5%. At the 1% level, transparency would only disclose positions more than 10 times the 
size of the average, and would disclose only those positions significantly more than two 
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Figure 3.1.3.A 
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standard deviations away from our sample sizes' mean1 6 4. It therefore follows that there is a very 
strong logarithmic correlation between market cap and average institutional position: 
Average institutional stake varies with firm size 
0.180 
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Figure 3.1.3.C 
A n R 2 of over 0.6 shows a very strong correlation. As one would expect, as the size of a f i rm 
decreases, an institution makes a correspondingly larger position, relative to the f i rm. The 
logical implication from this is that in absolute terms, institutions tend to take similarly sized 
positions. It therefore follows that, given the wide range of market capitalisation of leading 
stocks (in our sample set running from $427 billion to $1.2 billion), our analysis shows that a 
significant holding varies in direct proportion to size. 
1 6 4 Standard deviation = 0.03, mean = 0.075, median = 0.076. n.b. 2 standard deviations either side of a sample set's 
mean is considered statistically significant, and should be only 5% of a sample size - i.e. a declarable stake level of 
0.6% would only "catch", statistically, 5% of institutional positions. 
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Observation 1 therefore suggests that there is a strong case for either a variability of 
granularity of transparency according to size, set to a level sufficiently fine to identify 
statistically significant stakes, or for a universally fine degree of transparency to cover both ends 
of the spectrum. A universal level, even as small as 1%, is therefore inadequate. 
3.1.3 Observation 2: Whilst calculating "turnover" of institutional positions is difficult, 
superficial analysis suggests that turnover may be as high as 10% of a firm per month. 
Calculating how frequently the average institution "turns over"' 6 5 is very difficult 
to do accurately. There are two possible approaches, both of which are flawed in 
different ways. The first approach is to look at monthly share turnover figures sourced 
from the relevant stock exchanges. The problem wi th these figures is that they include 
all trading in an individual firm's shares - not just the trading in institutions' positions1 6 6. 
A histogram (frequency) showing the variance in monthly net share turnover as a 
percentage of a firm's market capitalisation is shown below. The results are very 
approximately normally distributed around a median of approximately 15% of share 
capital, see figure A below. 
1 6 5 i.e. changes an individual holding 
1 6 6 This problem will be particularly accentuated for market-made (i.e. quote driven not order-matched stocks), 
where one or more market-makers are involved in trading small blocks of shares at high frequency to provide 
liquidity to other market participants. 
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The second possible method is to use 13-F f i l ing data, by comparing 
institutional positions at the beginning and end of each reporting period. This has two 
problems. Firstly, reporting is periodic - and so by measuring turnover across periods, 
one misses out on inter-period changes in positions. The data itself is also conceptually 
difficult to analyse - wi th gross changes in institutional ownership the more intuitive 
analytically. 
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Figure 3.1.4.B 
Figure B shows that institutional turnover is normally distributed around 
approximately 20%. 
These data cannot be taken too seriously, for all of the reasons already given. It 
also over-emphasises the importance of shorter-term institutions, which have an 
arguably lesser importance in the context of the transparency debate. However, the 
general point that transparency is time sensitive is reinforced by these data. It is difficult 
to quantify the requirement for timeliness, but one could tentatively suggest that the 
data justify sensitivity at the 2 weeks - 1 month level. 
n 
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3.2 Observation three: Institutional holdings make extensive use of trust structures, and 
transparency needs to be able to penetrate through many "layers" of nominee accounts'6 7 
The obvious question, f rom an educated layman or observer, would be "Why, in an era of 
dematerialised share registers, is there a problem w i t h transparency at all?" 1 6 8 The logic behind 
this question is obvious - wi th the advent of the CREST system in the UK, and similar systems 
elsewhere, any interested party can simply request access to the shareholder register and look 
up the names of the registered shareholders directly. The problem wi th this is that it ignores 
the impact of nominee accounts and beneficial share ownership (except under certain limited 
jurisdictions, such as Scandinavia, which have their own distinct problems, discussed below in 
section D). There are essentially two problems wi th nominee share ownership. Firstly, shares 
are registered not in the name of the underlying owner, but instead in the name of a nominee 
account. The nominee account may be a direct 1 - 1 account - such that wi th the right 
information it is possible to line up the account wi th the underlying owner - or a pooled 
nominee account, where many underlying shareholders use the same account i n which to hold 
their shares. Some hypothetical examples are set out below 1 6 9 
1 6 7 The following examples and explanation draw heavily on Ryder & Register, "Investor Relations", and the 
following additional sources: 
R. Minns. Pension Funds and British Capitalism, (London: Heinemann, 1980) 41 
Committee of Inquiry into UK Vote Execution (London: National Association of Pension Funds, 1999) 
The Law of Pension Fund Investment (London: Butterworths, 1990) C h . 4 
Institutional Shareholder and Corporate Governance (Above) 
Linklaters & Paines, Unit Trusts. The Law and Practice (London-.Longman, 1989) 
1 6 8 In fact, the 2003 IIRF survey, above, found that this was, in fact, one of the most common comments from 
industry professionals when surveyed. See http://www.iirf.org/transparency 
1 6 9 The examples and diagrams that follow are based on this author's industry knowledge and informal interviews 
with industry participants (particularly with Richard Jenkinson of Junction RDS). Supporting data can be found in 
the DTI Nationwide shareholder data (above). 
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10,000,000 share in X Pic. 
r 
Registered under Nominee 
account "Nutraco #1715" 
Figure 1 
Such a holding would, in fact, be partially transparent, as the Nutraco nominee account 
is a one-to-one designated nominee account for Merrill Lynch Asset Management. However, 
this would not reveal the controlling interests or even the beneficial owner, since the funds 
may be under management on behalf of a pension trust, or may have voting rights vested 
elsewhere. Thus, given that "equities owned beneficially by institutional investors...are 
managed by fund management firms. ... In the case of some firms...the vast majority of assets 
under management are those of external clients"170, we know that the structure employed may 
(and almost inevitably will) be more complex than the above example. Therefore varying 
figure one, we may hypothesise the following example -
1 7 0 ibid, at 5 
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10,000,000 share in X Pic. 
The member 
Registered under a Nominee account 
The holder of 
Control Rights 
I 
Asset Management Firm 
The Beneficiary 
i 
Pension Trust 
Figure 2 
Control rights tend to encompass voting rights and information rights, and normally also carry 
a discretionary right to trade the shares in question.171 They may, and often will, be divested 
across many sets of fund managers, with voting rights attaching to corporate governance 
agents, transfer rights vested in the fund manager, and information rights still vested 
elsewhere172. It is therefore apparent that the process of shareholder identification is much 
more complex than it may initially appear. For various reasons, it may be essential to identify 
both the beneficiary and the agent holding controlling interests (hereafter 'the agent'). By 
amalgamating all the above information one can compose a hypothetical bottom-up model. 
1 7 1 See G.P.Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 89. 
1 7 2 See Pensions Act, 1995, s34. 
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" P E E L I N G T H E ONION" 
Who owns X Y Z P L C ? 
UK fixed income portfolio 
Management contracts 
Foreign equities portfolio 
County Council employees 
Future liability 
Northumberland C.C. Pension Fund 
UK equities portfolio 
Asset Manager 2 Asset Manager 1 Asset Manager 3 
Shareholding 
Management 
contracts 
ABC Investment Trust DEF Hedge Fund 
GHI Custodians Ltd MNO Custodians Ltd JKL Custodians Ltd 
Registered shareholdings 
PQR Registrars Ltd 
Agency agreement 
X Y Z P L C 
NAPF Voting 
Advisory Service 
Figure 31 7 
It would be too complex to map the holding structures of such funds even covering two 
or three of the companies in which they held shares. Figure 3, therefore, attempts to illustrate 
simply the complexity of the task at hand. It also illustrates that the process may not be as 
simple as identifying one beneficial holder or identifying one controlling agent, as there may 
1 7 3 Based on a similar illustration by Ryder & Register, above, at 72 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership 
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
-83-
be several174. Monte Titoli's legal department have also helpfully provided the following 
illustrations of ownership structures which they have encountered in their own work 1 7 5 : 
Ownership Structure 
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3.2.1 Observation four: share ownership is becoming rapidly more of a global issue and 
transparency needs to be analysed within this context. 
The increasingly global nature of capital markets is an oft-discussed issue, and there is 
little purpose in repeating the debate here. That cross-border ownership in the UK has 
increased in recent years is an undisputed fact: 
"The total "overseas" holding of UK equities increased from 7 per cent in 1963 to 13 per cent in 
1992. It then accelerated to 24 per cent by 1998...the slight decline in the proportionate holding of 
local institutions between 1992 and 1998 has almost certainly been offset by an increase in the 
holding of overseas institutions.176" 
m The additional complexities of where one fund holds a compound interest (i.e. one exercised through two or 
more fund managers operating independently of the other through separate management contracts, possibly 
managed in different countries) in the same stock is considered below 
1 7 5 See : "The Shareholder ownership chain" - Ennio Delia Piane and Andre Perrone, legal department, Monte 
Titoli 
1 7 6 Share ownership and control in UK, above, at 4 
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The impact of this is obvious - i f transparency regulations are only effective within a 
domestic context then they are already, and are increasingly even more, inadequate. It is vital 
that the analysis that follows is focused on effectiveness in the context of global capital markets. 
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4 Section D - a proposed transparency of ownership benchmark 
As discussed in sections A, B, and C above, the goals of transparency of ownership and 
accountability vary according to the parties concerned. Table 4.1 below sets out the major 
concerns discussed in the above sections, broken down by party concerned. 
Parties Objectives / Justifications Qualifications / Problems 
n n 
f t rt 
T3 
a 
SO 
I 
Accountability on governance, voting, and 
decision making. Enable beneficiaries to assess 
performance of managing agents. Create an 
environment where general public and 
governments are able to assess "wrong doing" by 
participants and regulate effectively. 
Providing incentive structures to improve 
performance of both participants - through 
encouraging active ownership and well as active 
management - and that of company management 
from resulting increased monitoring and 
feedback. 
Highlight and discourage "conflicts of interest" 
and encourage the development of adequate 
structures / systems to manage those which are 
unavoidable. 
Costs of full transparency to institutions which 
would be ultimately borne by general public. 
Free-rider costs to individual fund managers' 
research investments. If transparency is too 
effective then incentives to engage in research 
and active ownership are decreased as others 
are able to "freeload" onto others' investments 
by replicating manager behaviour. 
The overall picture is very complex. It needs to 
be easy to identify who holds voting discretion 
and investment discretion over individual 
holdings, as well as being able to trace holdings 
back "up the tree" to beneficiaries. 
3 
n 
o 
3 
T3 
Reduced volatility through improved 
communication processes 
Effective and equitable allocation of management 
time (requires a long term "picture" of the 
shareholder base) 
Cost savings in the communication process. 
Auditing and monitoring the voting process 
Reduce role of highly conflicted financial 
intermediaries in the communication process. 
Timeliness essential for effective management 
of communication process. Need to carefully 
manage free rider problem (as above). 
Fine detail required - not adequate to identify 
holders at (for example) the 1% level, because 
of the significant absolute size of smaller stakes. 
a. 
n 
"5' 
C/5 
tr 
<-l n tr o_ 
K n 
Protection from wrong-doing in the takeover 
context. 
Improve the efficiency of the capital allocation 
process and to allow firms to understand the 
objectives and characteristics to fellow or 
potential fellow shareholders. 
Enable co-operative governance and overcoming 
some of the externalities (i.e. the free rider 
problem) that act to discourage investments in 
corporate governance by enabling shareholders 
to co-operate in the process of applying pressure. 
Especially important in this context that other 
security holders are also identified, particularly 
equity derivatives where these carry voting 
rights, but also credit instruments. In the 
context of companies facing financial 
difficulties, credit instrument holders may 
assert more power than equity holders. 
Conflict exists on the issue of timeliness. For 
one, it is important that a prospective 
shareholder knows that a short-term activist 
hedge fund has just taken a large stake, but it is 
also important that the hedge funds' research 
investment is protected. 
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In the light of the above table, it is clearly obvious that assessing the current legal 
regimes in place depends on formulating a clear set of standards that take into account the 
above concerns and complications. The issue is not at this stage how either law or 
commercial practice should enable these requirements to be achieved, but by what 
standard existing systems should be assessed. The author proposes the following seven 
point test. 
1} A test of comprehensiveness 
Transparency should not be limited to equity instruments, but should cover 
equities, credit instruments and all derivative instruments which carry voting rights 
or which can be used directly to influence management, for example debt 
covenants, or can convert to instruments carrying such rights. 
2} A test of personage 
Transparency should not be limited to institutions, but where possible holdings 
should be connected to individuals of influence in exercising either investment 
discretion or voting discretion, such that those persons can be clearly identified, 
communicated with and where appropriate held accountable, just as the managers 
of public companies are. In other words, transparency should target the genuine 
decision makers/fund managers themselves - ie. the individuals who in fact exercise 
investment discretion. And firms should not be able to shield those genuine 
decision makers behind nominated individuals (such as 'corporate governance 
officers') who in fact do not take significant decisions. 
3) A test of timeliness 
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Transparency should be as close to real-time as technology and practicality allows, 
subject to the qualifications under tests 6 and 7. 
4} A test of proportionality 
Transparency should be implemented in such a way as to scale in the detail of 
coverage proportionate to the size of the underlying f i rm 1 7 7 . The level of 
transparency should be proportionate to the size of the position this represents, and 
be sufficiently detailed so as to enable all of the functions of transparency to be 
effectively fulfilled. 
5} A test of global effectiveness and universality 
Transparency regimes should function effectively. Any rules and regulations should 
be applied equally and should be equally effective, so that individual classes of 
participants or nationalities of participants are not unfairly able to avoid having to 
disclose holdings. A regime of transparency should be functionally and practically 
effective, particularly in a global and cross-border context. 
6) A test of competitiveness, cost and efficiency 
Transparency regimes should not impose any significant cost burdens on any 
parties. The system(s) should not threaten the competitiveness of any one or more 
major financial centres through overly burdensome regulation or the creation of 
competitive advantages through non-compliance. Transparency measures should be 
efficient in their operation, not prone to errors nor time consuming to implement. 
1 7 7 A Vi % holding in the largest firm in the S&P 500 would equate to approximately $2 Billion (larger than a 100% 
holding in the smallest!) whereas for the smallest firm this would amount to only $ 6.2 Million (figures correct as 
of 29/12/2006, see http://wrww2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/500factsheet.pdf). 
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Any rules or regulations should be clear, easy to understand, unambiguous and 
simple and not burdensome to comply with. 
7) A test of differentiation 
Regardless of how transparency data is collected, it should be distributed or made 
available differentially to different parties. In particular, there should be a delay in 
the timeliness of the information that should vary dependent on the cost of 
dissemination to that party borne by the provider or the participant whose holding 
is being disclosed (i.e. the value of research investment destroyed by the disclosure 
concerned). 
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5 Section E - benchmarking the existing structures, systems and regulations 
5.1 The major systems of transparency in place across the major countries researched. 
Whilst the provisions and laws in place across the countries surveyed are set out in detail 
under section 5.2 below, the author has attempted to categorise the major systems in 
place in table 5.1.1 : 
Type Description Failings 
Declarable stakes 
("Triggered" Disclosure) 
Participants are obliged to 
disclose holdings where such a 
holding is above a given 
threshold. Disclosure made to 
either the company, to a 
regulator or to a central register. 
Requires continual checking 
by participant and auditing 
by regulator. Difficult to 
enforce. 
Insufficiently detailed. 
Imprecise. Impersonal. 
Disclosure "on demand" Participants are obliged to 
disclose either holdings or 
underlying beneficial interests at 
the demand of a regulator, 
intermediary or company. 
Expensive, inefficient, 
impossible to verify, difficult 
to enforce. 
Disclosure by registration Registers, updated either 
periodically or shortly after 
transactions. Includes simple 
nominee registers (such as a UK 
register), and full beneficial 
interest registers. 
Depends on the quality and 
accuracy of registered data. 
Questions must be raised 
over whether practically 
workable in a global context. 
Mere nominee registration 
effectively useless. 
5.2 The UK model 
A public company may by notice in writing require [disclosure from] a person whom the company 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be or, at any time during the 3 years immediately 
1 7 8 The following sections, aside from the materials covering the UK, draws heavily upon "Disclosure of share 
ownership in listed companies: an international legal survey", Charles Mayo, Simmons & Simmons, 2004. The 
author acted as the UK based liaison and co-ordinator for this study. 
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preceding the date on which the notice is issued, to have been interested in shares comprised in the 
company's relevant share capital1 7 9 
5.2.1 The shareholder register180 
In the UK shares in public quoted companies are generally not issued as bearer 
shares, but are registered (or "dematerialised"). The company is required to keep a register of 
shareholders ("members"), under section 133 of the Companies Act 2006 (s. 352 of the 
Companies Act (1985)). The register must include names and addresses181 and the number of 
shares held1 8 2. There are penalties for failing to keep a register accurately183. Whilst the Act 
implies that the register should generally be kept at a companies office 1 8 4, the Act allows for a 
register to be maintained by a 3 r d party, and for the register to be kept at their office1 8 5. A 
register is generally to be kept in an easily accessible manner with an appropriate index186 and 
there is a comprehensive and general right to access to the register by the public187. For the 
purposes of this thesis however the key provision in the act is s. 126 which states that "No 
notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive, shall be entered on the register, or be 
receivable by the r eg i s t r a r .Given the prevalence of nominee accounts for share registration 
this means that merely reviewing a shareholder register is not sufficient under the seven tests 
1 7 9 Companies Act 1985, Chapter 6, s.212 (Eng.) 
1 8 0 It should be noted that the position in the UK has not been substantially impacted by the Companies Act 2006, 
which came into force in part from the beginning of 2007. References given are to the Companies Act 2006, with 
the corresponding section of the 1985 act where appropriate. The exception is s.212, where the author will 
continue to refer to s.212 notices because of the wide extent of their common usage in the context of shareholder 
identification amongst non-legal practitioners. 
1 8 1 s. 113(2) 
1 8 2 s. 113(3) 
1 8 3 S. 113(7) 
1 8 4 S. 113(1) 
1 8 5 S. 113(l)(b) 
1 8 6 s. 115 
1 8 7 S. 116 
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established above. Fortunately, there are two major classes of provisions which enhance the 
quality of available data in the UK. 
5.2.2 Declarable Stakes 
Under ss.792188 any person, legal or natural, acquiring an interest in the relevant 
proportion, normally 3%, of "Relevant share capital" must disclose as such to the company 
within the prescribed period189. Under s792(2) it may even be interpreted as requiring 
disclosure at 3% of any class of shares, even if that holding is significantly lower than 3% of the 
total voting capital. Disclosure must occur within the prescribed period running from 
registration - which is most relevant in the context of share issues190, but only when the holder 
becomes aware of the arising of his interest191. The definition of what comprises an interest is 
extremely wide 1 9 2 with a small number of exclusions including derivative options, but only 
where they do not have attached voting rights193. 
5.2.3 Concert Parties 
Protection against the stealthy acquisition of holdings through what are known as 
"concert parties" is also offered by both the Act and the Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
Under s.824 the definitions of a "concert party" and the precise rules applicable to them are 
quite complex - and setting them out here in some depth is unnecessary, save that to state that 
1 8 8 CA 2006 
1 8 9 Note that this requirement places a greater obligation that required under relevant directives, above. 
1 9 0 National Westminster Bank Pic v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1995] 1 A.C. 119 HL. 
191 s 792 
1 9 2 s.820 
1 9 3 s.820 
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under s.825 each member of the party is taken for the purposes of ss.792 to be interested in not 
only his own holdings but also the holdings of persons with whom he is acting in concert. As 
such, any notification that he makes must also list the names of such persons and their 
interests194. 
5.2.4 Disclosure "on demand" 
Provisions that relate to demand-led disclosure under what was s.212 of the Companies 
Act 1985, and now s.793 of the Companies Act 2006, allow a company to serve notice on a 
person whom it knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, has195 an interest in voting shares in 
the company. The notice may essentially ask two things, firstly to give particulars of his own 
past or present interest196 and any other interests known to him 1 9 7, and secondly, where that 
interest is a past interest, to give details of the current holder198. It also requires that that person 
also discloses details of other persons who have an interest in the same shares199. Response must 
be within a reasonable time2 0 0, but no guidance is given on what a reasonable time may be -
other than that only 2 days will probably be unreasonable201. Thus where a person is the 
beneficiary of a nominee holding, on behalf of a further beneficiary, he must confirm his own 
interest and give details of the person for whose benefit he holds such an interest. Under s.808 
m S.825 
1 9 5 or to have had in the past 3 years 
1 9 6 s.793 (3) 
1 9 7 s.793 (4) 
1 9 8 s.793 (4) 
1 9 9 s.793 (5) 
2 0 0 s.793 (7) 
2 0 1 Re Lonrho [1988] BCLC 53, [1987] BCC 265 
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/ s.810 (formerly s.211 and s.219) any such register composed must be made available to the 
public of disclosures made under both s.793 and the declarable stakes provisions. 
5.2.5 The Transparency Directive202 
The Transparency Directive updated and amended parts of the Consolidated Admissions 
and Reporting Directive and was implemented in the UK by regulations made under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000. The Directive recognised that: 
Efficient, transparent and integrated securities markets contribute to a genuine single market in the 
Community and foster growth and job creation by better allocation of capital and by reducing costs. The 
disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about security issuers builds sustained investor 
confidence and allows an informed assessment of their business performance and assets. This enhances both 
investor protection and market efficiency.203 
The directive was generally concerned with market transparency as a whole, with a 
particular emphasis on issuer transparency and the ongoing harmonisation of capital markets in 
line with the preamble objective quoted above. Article 9 however required member states to 
implement a regime of declarable stakes, with minimum declarable stakes starting at 5%204. This 
has had no impact on the position in the UK with declarable stake levels well below the 
required minimum 2 0 5. 
2 0 2 2004 /109/EC (full text at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/1 390/1 39020041231en00380057.pdf) 
2 0 3 Transparency Directive (above) at p.l (s.l) 
2 0 4 Article 9(1) 
2 0 5 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/EU/fsap/td/index.shtrril for further information 
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5.2.6 Remedies for breach 
Failure to comply with such an order may, under s.794 (formerly s.216), subject such 
shares to restrictive measures preventing the voting, issuing or transfer of such shares. This is 
limited to what the person being asked actually knows and where the person in question can 
show that the requirement on him was "frivolous or vexatious"206. 
5.2.6.1 The issue of "reasonable" time 
It is worth noting that there is continuing confusion over the what constitutes a 
reasonable time period to respond to s.212 (s.793 - hereafter considered equivalent) notices -
there has been some weight of comment on this issue, of particular note is "Section 212 
Companies Act 1985; what is a reasonable time?"207 and Re Lonrho (No. 2) cited below. 
5.2.7 The case law 
Given the scarcity of the case law on disclosure of interests in the UK, and the variety of 
points they detail, a number of them and their main findings are detailed below. 
5.2.7.1 Re F H Llovd Holdings pic 2 0 8 
Lloyd Holdings restated the original purposes of the provisions under the 1981 act 
clearly: 
2 0 6 s.795 (2) 
3 0 7 Freshfields, available at B.J.I.B. & F.L 1989, 4(3), 145-146 (Butterworth's Journal of International Banking & 
Finance Law). There is also some reasonable discussion of the relevant issues from a practical perspective in 
'Patrolling your share register', P.L.C. 1990, 1(3) 18-19 
2 0 8 [1985] BCLC 293 
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"...the clear purpose of Part IV of the 1981 Act 2 0 9 is to give a public company, and 
ultimately the public at large, a prima facie unqualified right to know who are the real 
owners of its voting shares"210 
This reading of the intentions behind this part of the act was echoed by the DTI 
in their 1995 consultation : 
"[Firstly] The department considers that the original purpose of Part VI was to enable 
companies to know who might be in a position to influence their affairs.. .[and secondly] 
market transparency, since the information notified to listed companies...must 
be.. .made public"2" 
In the case law that followed Lloyd the courts were to echo this reading, and to 
give significant priority to a company's (and hence the publics) rights "to know" under s. 
212. 
5.2.7.2 Re Geers Gross pic 2 1 2 
Geers Gross highlights one of the key failings of the provisions under s.212 - which is 
that whilst in a purely domestic context it is highly effective, in a global and cross-
border context it comes into strong conflict with other national laws213. The facts were 
summarised in the reported judgement: 
2 0 9 Which became part X V of the 1985 act. 
2 1 0 Nourse LJ, at 293 
2 1 1 Company Law Reform, "Proposals for reform of part VI of the companies act, 1985", April 1995, DTI 
2 1 2 [1988] 1 All ER 224, (also : [1987] 1 W L R 1649, [1988] BCLC 140, [1987] BCC 528) 
2 1 3 Swiss banking secrecy laws, especially under Article 47 on the Swiss Law on Banks and Articles 43 & 44 of the 
Swiss Stock Exchange Law, strictly prohibit disclosing client data, such as which clients own which shares, under 
fear of very strict penalties. A Swiss banks' refusal to disclose holding data under these circumstances is 
understandable. 
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"E entered in to an agreement w i t h GG, a publ ic ly quoted company, not to acquire 
more than 20% o f its share capital. GG suspected that E migh t have breached the 
agreement by using nominee companies, and obtained an order. . . imposing 
restr ict ions. . .on the transfer of...shares (i.e. about 3% o f GG's share capi tal) . . .held by 
a nominee company on behalf o f a Swiss bank. The bank refused to disclose the names 
o f its clients w h o had bought the shares." 2 1 4 
Not only this, but s.793 (old s.212) letters o f ten falls f o u l o f the sheer 
stubbornness or p la in ignorance o f internat ional shareholders. D u r i n g the course o f 
the i r survey into the practical effect o f transparency measures globally the I I R F and 
Citigate concluded that a typical response f r o m U.S. inst i tut ions varied f r o m "not 
understanding the 212 letter" or "not t h i n k i n g i t applied to t h e m " 2 1 5 to an absolute 
refusal to recognise that foreign law binds their holdings 2 1 6 . The courts response i n 
Geers Gross is important : 
"Since a public company has a pr ima facie unqual i f ied r igh t to k n o w w h o were 
the real owners of its vo t ing shares the court could take in to account.. . whether there 
had been a fai lure to disclose relevant facts about the shares. Since GG w o u l d be less 
able to determine the beneficial ownership o f the shares and whether E had breached 
the agreement once the shares were sold, the applicants fai lure to disclose the iden t i ty 
2 1 4 Ibid, at 224 
2 1 5 Non-attributable quoted in the 2003 IIRF survey, included in the appendices. 
2 1 6 Such as : "Where is your aircraft carrier then?", Nick Arbuthnott, Citigate, interview with author, 2004 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership -97-
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
o f the owners of the shares was suff ic ient reason f o r the court to refuse to give 
approval . . .notwi ths tanding that innocent purchasers of the shares migh t be deprived 
o f the benef i t o f ownership fo r an indef in i te per iod ." 2 1 7 
The court clearly f o u n d that the r igh t o f a company to iden t i fy the holders o f 
vo t ing rights was effect ively inviolate - over and above rights of effect ively innocent 
t h i r d parties. More impor tan t ly , the court refused to f i n d that a company's r igh t i n this 
respect could be l i m i t e d i n any way i n terms o f the accuracy or exactness o f the 
in fo rma t ion being sought. S. 212 / 6 does provide a t r u l y effective method o f 
i den t i f y ing beneficial owners - but may require serious aggravation of the owners i n 
question i n order to achieve i t w h i c h may not be practical or sensible fo r public 
companies i n a broader context. 
5.2.7.3 Re Bestwood p i c 2 1 8 
Re Bestwood raised t w o points o f significant note. The f i rs t is an i l lus t ra t ion o f the 
complexi ty o f ho ld ing structures - i n Bestwood the court had to consider th i r teen separate 
respondents - and those were just the parties whose responses that the court f o u n d 
inadequate or were contested i n some way. The structure, being somewhat complex as 
reported i n the judgement, is i l lustrated below: 
2 1 7 Supra., at 224, authors emphasis 
2 1 8 [1989] BCLC 606 & [1989] BCC 620 
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Rekcin Investments L td . U n k n o w n Beneficiaries 
Guy Puckle & Co. 
t 
Unlisted "Sub" Nominees 
t \ 
Barclays (Angel Court Nominees Ltd.) UOB Nominees Ltd. Algbank Nominees Ltd. 
t 
Registered Holdings i n Bestwood Pic 
The second po in t of note is that the court f o u n d al l of the contested nominees liable f o r 
costs - taking the v i ew that "paid commercial nominees are professionals. They k n o w the 
ropes. . . i f they act f o r overseas beneficiaries and f i n d themselves i n a posit ion where, as a 
result o f the default o f their beneficiaries, they are made defendants to l i t iga t ion , they take 
the risk that orders fo r costs may be made against them. . .a f o r t i o r i i t should be the posit ion o f 
a mortgagee w h o is registered as the shareholder for his o w n interest and protect ion." 2 I 9 . 
However this is on ly the case where the nominee has "[not ] provided f u l l i n fo rma t ion w i t h i n 
his power . . .o r has contr ibuted to the costs w h i c h have been incurred" 2 2 0 . Thus, the court 
effect ively l imi t ed a nominee's du ty to prov id ing the best i n fo rma t ion available to h i m at the 
present t ime and to acting i n a t imely fashion. 
2 1 9 MiUett) at 3 
2 2 0 Ibid, at 4 [authors emphasis] 
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5.2.7.4 Re Ricardo Group p i c 2 2 1 
W h i l s t the substance o f Ricardo dealt w i t h a detailed and complex dispute over the nature 
o f interests transferred under contractual obligations. O f more interest, and relevance, 
was M i l l e t t J.'s concise judgement on the issue o f costs, w h i c h requires no elaboration: 
"in my judgement, these restriction order are not to be used as weapons to gain a temporary advantage 
over an opponent in a contested takeover bid. Their only legitimate purpose is to coerce a recalcitrant 
respondent into providing the requisite information. The company ought not to rush off to court 
without prior warning and see ex parte relief, unless it has reason to believe (a) that the respondent is 
deliberately withholding information, and (b) that if prior warning were given the respondent would 
dispose of his shares and thus evade the imposition of restrictions without which the information 
would be unlikely to be forthcoming".222 
5.2.7.5 R e L o n r h o (no. I ) 2 2 3 
Lonrho (transcript), was the first o f a series o f judgements relat ing to incomplete or inaccurate 
disclosures under the o ld s.212 - 216 du r ing the hostile takeover o f the Lonrho group. Browne 
Wi lk inson ' s judgement demonstrates the comprehensiveness o f the obligations that arise under 
s.212, especially i n the internat ional / cross-border context. He argued that: 
"It is grossly negligent, in my view, for a corporation to go into the market and make hostile 
acquisitions of shares without ensuring that, whatever happens, it has the means to comply with the 
[relevant] statutory requirements...It is not possible to enter this type of sophisticated market 
properly and without gross negligence if you do not have in place the necessary organisation to 
ensure that the information required by that market is forthcoming and if given."224 
2 2 1 [1989) BCLC 566, [1989] BCC 388 
2 2 2 Ibid, at 575 
2 2 3 Transcript: Chilton Vint, Chancery (Companies) July 1989, also see Re Lonrho Pk, [1988] BCLC 53 
2 2 4 Sir Nicholas Browne Wilkinson V C , at 19 
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I n the reported judgement (as opposed to the judgement on facts, as detailed i n the 
transcript) , the issue before the court was whether House o f Fraser Holdings L td . had answered 
a s.212 notice adequately. V ine lo t t J. summarised the posit ion by stating that " in reply to a 
notice. . .he in i t i a l l y gave some u n h e l p f u l and facetious replies. These replies seem to me 
ent i re ly out of place. A company is ent i t led to expect a prompt , f u l l and f r a n k reply to an 
enquiry under s.212...[This] and its related sections are an impor tan t part o f the machinery 
afforded by the 1985 act to aid the proper supervision o f the conduct o f the stock market 2 2 5 " 
5.2.7.6 Re Lonrho (No. 3 ) 2 2 6 
Re Lonrho (No. 3) introduces one impor tan t qual i f icat ion to No. 1, a l lowing an exception 
f o r understandable human fai lure. I n this case, the judgement was given by H o f f m a n n J : 
"the discretion s.216(2) gives the cour t . . . [ i s impor tant i n that] . . . [ the] subsection says that 
the order may be made. I t does not say that i t must be made. In. . . [ this] . . .case there were 
reasonable grounds fo r supposing that the company had not . . .g iven f u l l and accurate 
i n f o r m a t i o n . . . I accept that the pol icy o f the Ac t is that there should be f u l l disclosure , 
but allowance must also be made fo r human f a l l i b i l i t y . . . " . 
5.2.7.7 Re Lonrho pic (No. 2 ) 2 2 7 
No. 2 was concerned w i t h the issue o f exactly h o w long is a "reasonable t ime" w i t h i n the 
scope o f the A c t to respond to a s.212 notice. The effect o f the judgement is to keep a 
"reasonable t ime" open ended. I t must include an allowance f o r the parties to consult w i t h 
2 2 5 Re Lonrho Pic. [1987] BCC 265 at 268 (authors emphasis) 
2 2 6 [1989] BCLC 480 
2 2 7 [1989] BCLC 309 
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English & Welsh solicitors (especially i n the context o f an overseas organisation), but need 
not include an allowance for any holiday days where such holidays are not recognised as 
such i n the U K . The remainder o f the judgement was concerned w i t h detailed matters are 
not relevant to the remainder o f this discussion. 
5.2.8 The adequacy o f existing provisions 
Seven tests were proposed, under section 3 above, against w h i c h to test the various 
systems analysed i n this section o f the paper. These tests were: 
5.2.8.1 Comprehensiveness 
The U K system fails on the test o f comprehensiveness. The law applies on ly to equity 
instruments (and probably derivatives, a l though as already mentioned there is no clear 
posit ion regarding derivatives). Credit instruments are excluded f r o m these provisions, as 
are credit derivatives. 
5.2.8.2 Personage 
The U K system fails on the test o f personage. S.793 notices do not require 
disclosure o f ind iv idua l or individuals w i t h "investment discretion" as proposed under 
this test. 
5.2.8.3 Timeliness 
The U K system neither passes nor fails the test of timeliness. W h i l s t the U K 
allows relat ively prompt discovery of share ownership, i t requires s.793 letters to be sent 
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back and f o r t h , o f t en requir ing several letters to "pierce" th rough complex webs of 
nominees and sub-nominees. This is not so much a problem w i t h the provisions per se, 
rather i t is a problem w i t h the commercial and practical usage o f s.793 notices. 
5.2.8.4 Propor t ional i ty 
The U K system does not specifically address the issue o f propor t ional i ty . 
Declarable stakes obviously fa i l under this test, but s.793 effect ively provides a company 
w i t h the means to i d e n t i f y holders to whatever scale they deem appropriate. The system 
therefore effect ively passes this test. 
5.2.8.5 Global effectiveness and universal i ty 
The U K system part ial ly passes this test. As seen above, s.793 is f u l l y effective i n a 
confronta t ional context at discovering stakes, or rendering the shares effect ively useless 
u n t i l such disclosure is made. However, s.793 does suffer a large degree o f practical 
ineffectiveness i n the context o f day to day use by corporations. There has been l i t t l e 
research i n this matter, other than the I IRF survey already mentioned. They found that 
the largest p roblem w i t h s.793 was s t ra ightforward non-response. The worst culprits 
were f o u n d to be cont inenta l holders, fo l lowed by U.S. ins t i tu t ions 2 2 8 . I n the case o f 
cont inental inst i tut ions, the problem was o f t en one o f a fai lure o f understanding - o f t en 
because share ownership operates w i t h i n an unregistered system, i.e. one o f bearer 
rather than registered shares. Here the domestic banks and small inst i tut ions are 
2 2 8 IIRF, 2003, above 
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unfami l ia r w i t h U K provis ion and are unused to the whole no t ion o f transparency at 
levels below that o f declarable stakes. Al te rna t ive ly some insti tut ions are simply 
belligerent, especially i n the US. The US system of disclosure works i n a very d i f ferent 
way, through a central repor t ing mechanism for inst i tut ions, so that fa i lure to 
understand the nature o f the 793 letter is hardly surprising. The large insti tutions are 
less of ten the culprits, "The t r u l y in ternat ional ins t i tu t ion , a F ide l i ty or a Capital, 
understands the s. 212 le t ter . . .and obeys i t " 2 2 9 . One response ment ioned by a 
respondent i n the survey was fo r an ins t i tu t ion to question the applicabil i ty o f U K law to 
a US based ins t i tu t ion , asking "where your aircraft carrier i s " 2 3 0 to enforce the U K 
provisions. 
Al te rna t ive ly , comply ing w i t h s.793 requests brings some market participants 
in to direct conf l ic t w i t h domestic law. For example, a Swiss bank could be caught 
between domestic c r imina l sanctions and the effective confiscation o f capital, 
part icular ly as permanent non-compliance may leave the shares i n question 
permanently f r o z e n 2 3 1 . 
8) Competitiveness, cost and ef f ic iency 
The U K system fails this test. There is no data or research, that the author could 
find, that addresses or attempts to estimate the cost of sending and reply ing to s.793 
notices, or f o r inst i tut ions to administer a system o f mon i to r ing al l o f it 's holdings to 
trigger declarable stake declarations. Regardless, given the extent to w h i c h technology 
2 2 9 Quoted in the CFI London presentation (above) 
2 3 0 IIRF Survey presentation - anonymous verbal comment. 
2 3 1 See Gower & Davies at p601, fn 70 
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has progressed, i t seems t r u l y inadequate to s t i l l be sending pieces o f paper al l over the 
country to determine something that could easily be handled electronically. I f on ly i n 
this aspect, s.793 and the associated provisions require re form. 
5.2.8.6 Di f f e ren t i a t ion 
The U K system also fails this test. There is no scope i n the U K f o r discr iminat ion 
between the various invo lved parties. 
5.2.8.7 Conclusion 
The existing case law demonstrates that i n a confrontat ional , "one o f f ' , or hostile 
context, s.212 and the associated U K provisions func t ion as an extremely effective 
method fo r investigating ind iv idua l holdings and fo r po l ic ing and enforcing 
transparency on ind iv idua l inst i tut ions. I t w i l l also become clear, as the systems i n place 
i n other countries are covered, that s.793 provides the best system fo r transparency 
current ly available i n any jur isdic t ion . I n the context o f the need fo r a continuous and 
on-going process o f transparency, s.793 suffers f r o m serious faults, on ly some o f w h i c h 
are repairable by legislative modi f ica t ion w i t h o u t substantial conceptual redesigning. 
The most serious o f these is the inheren t ly confronta t ional nature o f s.793 - repeatedly 
w r i t i n g to your shareholders to demand that they disclose 
5.3 Other commonweal th heritage systems, especially Australia 
W h i l s t the author does not w i s h to cover Austral ian or other minor -commonwea l th or 
commonweal th heritage systems i n great detail , i t is w o r t h no t ing that i n many areas they 
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operate very s imilar ly to the U K . Australia is the most impor tant of these, and Jonathan 
Beestall's, "Gett ing to k n o w your shareholders, a comparison between the U K and 
Aust ra l ia" 2 3 2 w h i c h covers this subject i n much more detail , is most useful f o r fu r the r detail. 
The most significant difference between Australia and the U K is that the Austral ian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) also have the power to request an s.212 style disclosure 
be made direct ly to t h e m 2 3 3 . 
5.4 Cont inenta l Europe - a comparative analysis o f the legal provisions available i n major 
cont inental European economies. 
Cont inental Europe, inc lud ing Switzerland, w i l l be handled as one group by the author, 
because o f the structural similarities between the various regulatory provisions. Rather 
than detail these ind iv idua l ly , the basic provisions are set out i n the table be low 2 3 4 . 
2 3 2 [1991] I C C R 97 
2 3 3 See Beestall, Ibid, at 99, and the Corporations Act, 2001, s. 9, s. 608, s. 671 and s.672, 
2 3 4 Information consolidated from information provided by Simmons & Simmons 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership - 106-
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
Country Relevant statute Declarable stakes Notes 
Austria Stock Exchange Act 1989, Articles 91 & 48 5%, and 5% 
increments to 50%, 
followed by 75% and 
90% 
Belgium Law of 2 March 1989, 
Royal Decree of 10 May 1989 
Articles 514 and following of the Company 
Code. 
"Transparency Legislation Information Code", 
April 2004 
5%, and all 5% 
increments there 
after 
The company code 
provides for individual 
company by-laws to 
require disclosure at 
the 3% level 
Denmark Securities Trading Consolidated Act, section 29 5%, and 5% 
increments from 10% 
France Code de Commerce, article L. 233-7 5%, 10%, 20%, 
33.33%, 50%, 
66.66%, 
The code does not 
even acknowledge a 
distinction between 
legal and beneficial 
ownership. 
Germany The Securities Acquisition and Take-over Act, 
sections 21 and 22 
5%, 10%, 25%, 50% 
and 75% 
Italy Law No. 58 of 1998 (the Consolidated Law on 
Financial 
Intermediation), and various regulations issued 
by CONSOB 
2%, 5%, 7.5%, 10% 
and further 
increments of 5% 
Netherlands Disclosure of Major Holdings in Listed 
Companies Act 1996 
5%, 10%, 25%, 50% 
and 66.66% 
Spain Law 24/1988, Royal Decree 377/1991, Order of 
23 April 1991 
5% and all further 5% 
increments 
Switzerland Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities 
Trading 1999, 
Articles 20 and 41; Ordinance of the Federal 
Banking 
Commission on Stock Exchanges and Securities 
Trading 
5%, 10%, 20%, 
33.33%, 50%, 66.66% 
Disclosures must be 
broken down by fund 
as well as institution. 
Swiss Banking Secrecy 
laws explicitly prohibit 
the disclosure of 
beneficial interests by 
Swiss intermediaries. 
The cont inental system has been affected by the E U Transparency Direct ive, w h i c h has 
been implemented i n various ways by member states. The substantive impact o f the Direct ive, 
as is relevant to this thesis is to harmonise declarable stake levels across the various member 
countries (all increments o f 5%). The below criticisms o f declarable stakes are s t i l l val id , and 
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the authors posit ion is that the 5% m i n i m u m stake level under the directive is w o e f u l l y 
inadequate. 
The cont inental system can therefore be categorised as one dependent on declarable stakes 
alone. The f o l l o w i n g seven test analysis focuses on that dependency. 
5.4.1.1 Comprehensiveness 
There is no provis ion f o r transparency o f derivative instruments or credit instruments. 
Not even al l equity holdings must be disclosed. 
5.4.1.2 Personage 
Declarable stakes make no allowances f o r disclosure o f personage. 
5.4.1.3 Timeliness 
As far as i t goes, declarable stakes must be disclosed i n a short period o f t ime, generally 
7-14 days. 
5.4.1.4 Propor t ional i ty 
The test o f propor t iona l i ty was or iginal ly proposed w i t h declarable stakes i n m i n d . 
The key prob lem w i t h requi r ing ind iv idua l stakes to be disclosed at a f ixed threshold 
is essentially that whi l s t a 5% ho ld ing i n HSBC Holdings Pic. w o u l d be very large, 
for , say, an A I M listed company even a 5% stake migh t w e l l represent an u t te r ly 
insignif icant por t ion o f even a small ins t i tu t ional f u n d . 
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5.4.1.5 Global effectiveness and universal i ty 
Declarable stakes are ineffect ive i n a global context. W i t h no means to police thei r 
existence declarable stakes rely on individuals to be knowledgeable about regional law. 
5.4.1.6 Competitiveness, cost and eff ic iency 
Constant mon i to r i ng of ind iv idua l stakes, par t icular ly w h e n this involves cross-
referencing mul t ip le funds to establish i f any ind iv idua l declarable stake level has been 
passed is required. There is no central registry fo r making such declarations and they 
require ind iv idua l inst i tut ions to have thei r o w n procedures f o r fo rmal no t i f i ca t ion i n 
place. 
5.4.1.7 Di f fe ren t i a t ion 
Di f fe ren t ia t ion is not addressed i n any of the ind iv idua l systems studied by the 
author. I t could easily be addressed by the regional authorities by adding t ime bars to 
publ icat ion o f the data i n question, but due to the inadequacies of the under ly ing 
data there seems l i t t l e point . 
5.4.2 Conclusion 
Declarable stakes are manifest ly inadequate i n the global capital market. They f a i l to deal 
w i t h nearly al l o f the under ly ing issues surrounding transparency o f ownership, except i n 
the case of the takeover context, where they are only part ia l ly successful, f a i l i ng to 
establish a means o f pol ic ing the declarations received. There is an urgent need to r e f o r m 
them on an E U wide basis. 
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5.5 The US model - disclosure under the 13-F system 
5.5.1 The US system 
W h i l s t U.S. company law is generally examined on a state by state basis, i n the context 
o f shareholder transparency the analysis is s impl i f ied because the bu lk o f the relevant 
law is f o u n d under s.13 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Ac t . I t has not been 
substantially changed since that t ime. The act provides fo r a similar regime o f declarable 
stakes to the U K 2 3 5 , albeit at the higher level o f 5%, inc lud ing protect ion f r o m concert 
parties 2 3 6 . Such reports are f i l ed w i t h "each exchange where the security is traded, and 
f i l ed w i t h the [Securities & Exchange] Commission" 2 3 7 . There is a con t inu ing obligat ion 
to report "material changes" at the 1 % leve l 2 3 8 . 
Alongside this though, every ins t i tu t ion w i t h an "aggregate fair market value on 
the last t rading day i n any o f the preceding twelve months o f at least $100,000,000" 
must f i l e a report w i t h the commission detai l ing "the name o f the issuer and the t i t le , 
class, CUSIP number, number of shares...and aggregate fair market value" of each 
security " w i t h w h i c h the. . . investment manager exercises investment discret ion" 2 3 9 . 
2 3 5 Section 13-D of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 - see http://w w\v. law.uc .edu/CCL/sldtoc .html for further 
information. 
2 3 6 S.13-D(3) 
2 3 7 S.13-D(1) 
2 3 8 S.13-D(3) 
2 3 9 S.13-F(1) 
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5.5.2 Analysis using the 7 test methodology 
5.5.2.1 Comprehensiveness 
Section 13 fails the f i rs t test of comprehensiveness. There is no provis ion f o r 
transparency o f derivative instruments or credit instruments. 
5.5.2.2 Personage 
Section 13 also fails the test o f personage. W h i l s t focusing on the issue of "Investment 
discretion" w h i c h the author applauds, there is no way o f i den t i fy ing specific 
individuals, as generally w i t h al l o f the regimes analysed i n this thesis. 
5.5.2.3 Timeliness 
Timeliness is one specific area on w h i c h the U.S. system fails notably. Three months is 
a w o e f u l l y inadequate t ime period i f the analysis on ins t i tu t ional posit ion turnover 
discussed i n Section 3, above, is correct. 
5.5.2.4 Proport ional i ty 
The U.S. system passes this test by default. Inst i tut ions have to report al l positions, 
however large or small they are, so the issue o f propor t ional i ty becomes irrelevant. 
5.5.2.5 Global effectiveness and universali ty 
The U.S. system is p r ima r i l y regional i n nature, al though i t allows non-US companies 
to i d e n t i f y its US based ins t i tu t ional owners. However , section 13 is not applicable to 
overseas inst i tut ions. 
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5.5.2.6 Competitiveness, cost and ef f ic iency 
The author has no v i ew on the cost and competitiveness impact o f section 13 versus 
alternatives, al though there is l i t t l e reason to believe i t is overly burdensome. 
Reporting, using the E D G A R system appears to be automated and f u l l y electronic. 
Using a central registry is h igh ly ef f ic ient and the onl ine database i n the authors o w n 
tests worked effect ively. 
5.5.2.7 Di f fe ren t i a t ion 
Again , section 13 makes no provisions f o r d i f fe ren t ia t ion between individuals i n 
d is t r ibu t ing the data i n question. Such a change to the law w o u l d be relatively 
minor , a l lowing for immediate d is t r ibu t ion to the company o f its o w n data, 
immediate disclosure to the regulator and a delay i n disclosing the data to the 
general publ ic and to other insti tutions. 
5.5.3 Conclusion 
The U.S. system appears to f u n c t i o n w e l l i n practice. I t is s t ructural ly in fe r io r to the U K 
system o f s.212 notices i n many ways, but is more cost effective and ef f ic ient through the 
use o f electronic report ing mechanisms. Its central failures are the exclusion o f smaller 
inst i tut ions and the t ime delay i n repor t ing and disclosing the relevant data. 
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5.6 The Nordic system - the fully domestically transparent system. 
A second alternative is a fully transparent system in place in some Scandinavian 
countries, specifically Norway and Finland. Finland's model240 is one of a central securities 
depository241 at which every domestic beneficiary must register its interests, and in which the 
use of nominee accounts is illegal. In Norway, the Securities Trading Act, and the Securities 
Registration Act, both of 1997, provide that, in addition to declarable stake provisions, all 
registered shareholders must be in either individual accounts, or for foreign shareholders only 
in Nominee accounts corresponding to one or more underlying investors. In the case of 
Foreign investors, the Registration act provides for Kredittilsynet, the regulatory body, to 
authorise such nominee accounts and to require, on demand, disclosure of the underlying 
beneficial owners. In Finland, in order to vote, foreign holders must register temporarily242. 
Superficially this system seems an ideal solution to the problem of opaque share ownership and 
agency, forcing institutions to disclose fully their interest in every domestic share that they 
own. Finnish companies seem to think so - with only 27% of IRO's surveyed unsatisfied with 
the domestic system243. However one need only examine the Finnish equities market briefly to 
identify why this system looks so successful: 34.4% of Finnish securities are owned by 
foreigners but note that Nokia Oyj, by far the largest Finnish company, is 89.19% owned by 
2 4 0 Legal data regarding the system in Finland has been difficult to locate. This information is based on sources of 
imprecise legal quality and would be improved greatly with detailed research that has been impossible within time 
frame available. 
2 4 1 CSD - established as "an option" by government bill in 1990. As of 30.11.2003 their book entry system had 188 
companies registered, with 901 912 registered owners. Market Cap. was €163.40 Billion - "The Finnish Book Entry 
System", HEX, 2003 at 24 
2 4 2 op. cit. at 6 
2 4 3 I IRF Survey, details given below, at 6 
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foreign investors244, it is impossible to calculate what proportion of foreign holders actually 
register their interests in order to vote but, given current voting trends coupled with a clear 
specific disincentive, one could assume it would not be very high 2 4 5. Whilst this model would 
deal with the domestic context very effectively, it lacks any enforcement power to compel 
foreign investors to disclose their holdings, which, with the reservations to it that have been 
noted above, the UK system does have. Whilst this means, in the authors opinion, that the 
Finnish system is potently ineffective on its own - a fact which should become progressively 
apparent to the Finnish corporate community as ownership of their securities divests - it may 
be highlighted as a constituent part of what might be assembled as a uniform "ideal" system. 
There is a further problem with this type of system, demonstrated aptly by the real-life 
example which is represented in the following figure. 
Swedish 
Pension 
Fund 
Management Coniract 
For a % of F U M 
US Asset 
Managements Firm 
Direct holding 
of X shares 
in ABC AB 
Investment of Y 
shares in ABC AB 
from US 
Figure 4 
2 4 4 op. cit. at 24 - A more representative figure is difficult to calculate. 
2 4 5 Given appropriate time and research resources this could be verified, but is impractical given the context at the 
time of writing. 
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In this example, taken from an non-attributable source246 - a Swedish pension fund 2 4 7, 
registered an interest of only X shares, when in fact its US fund manager had reinvested a 
portion of the management contract back into the same company in Sweden because of 
currency price movements and it should have declared X+Y. The result was a much higher 
stake held than was actually registered - and this was only uncovered by a shareholder analysis 
firm working on their behalf. Where the fund itself doesn't know its holding2 4 8 a system of 
compulsory disclosure ceases to work effectively -only a 212 type system enables companies to 
'drill down' into complex holding structures, albeit only through time-consuming procedures. 
The Finnish and Norwegian systems therefore function effectively, in a trans-national context, 
as little more than regimes of purely declarable stakes, and therefore the 7 test analysis is 
superfluous, given the comments above. 
2 4 6 The pension fund in question was in fact one of the largest Swedish pension funds and whilst this example was 
cited to the Author it has been done so on a strictly confidential basis. 
3 4 7 Note that the Swedish system of disclosure is very similar in the way it functions in practice to the Finnish 
system - with complete and compulsory disclosure of beneficial holdings. 
248 "Often the fund doesn't know what holdings its got" - R. Craighead, above 
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6 Section F - conclusions: towards a market driven global framework? 
6.1 Pulling the strands together 
Section E compared and analysed the various systems of transparency in several 
major capital markets and economies around the world focusing primarily on the UK 
system of demand-driven disclosure. It was clear that whilst the UK system surpasses 
alternative systems, it still fails in four key areas exposed using the 7 test methodology. 
1) It is a costly and inefficient method of obtaining ownership data, laying a costly 
burden on financial institutions to respond to individual paper-based requests. The 
nature of the process of operation prevents collection of top down data, preventing the 
sort of analysis used in section C, which would be of use for regulators for monitoring 
purposes. 
2) It fails to expose the crucial element of personage of ownership, which negates much 
of the potential benefits from disclosure of such ownership data. 
3) It fails to cover all classes of financial instrument, focusing primarily on equity 
securities. 
4) It fails to distinguish between the different parties to transparency, most notably 
between management, regulators and the general public. 
On an international comparison the demand driven system does compare 
favourably to other alternatives. The major flaws in the U.S. 13-F system are timeliness, 
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with an effective 3 months delay, comprehensiveness - as only qualifying institutions 
are obliged to disclose, and a failure to discriminate between the various parties so that 
holding data is publicly available. Systems relying on declarable stakes, such as 
Continental Europe, fail in a number of ways; most significantly they only account for a 
minority of positions, and lack a discovery mechanism to enable companies to "check 
up" on individual institutions that they believe may not be complying. The full 
disclosure model, used mainly in Scandinavian countries appears initially excellent, but 
suffers from failures in a global context, and acts as an effective "disincentive" to voting 
which negate a number of the benefits of the increased transparency their system is 
supposed to bring. 
The earlier analysis also raised a number of issues related to the globalisation of 
capital markets, and the problems this raises with transparency mechanisms. 
Particularly, concern was raised with the problems that cross-border holdings raise in 
terms of compliance and enforcement as well as the need not to create cost 
competitiveness issues that disadvantage one or more regional economies at the expense 
of others. 
It is also worth noting that transparency falls into part of a wider framework of 
securities legislation worldwide. The Giovannini Group concluded that "the pan-EU 
investor is required to access many national systems that practice and operate...within 
different tax and legal frameworks" 2 4 9 , and the author submits that this state of legal 
2 4 9 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/giovannini/clearingl 101_en.pdf 
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disharmony is causing many of the problems of shareholder disclosure. The problem is 
in fact more specific and distinct: 
Barrier 13 is the absence of an EU-wide framework for the treatment of ownership of securities... 
[Nominee] accounts are treated commercially and economically as being the focus of ownership. 
However, legally, their status differs across the E U . There is a lack of clarity about who has what 
rights and of what kind when securities are held for investors...even with solutions [to the conflicts] 
clearly in view...there remains a need for something more - a modernisation of the substantive 
law. 2 5 0 
The problem of transparency is compounded by differences in the way securities 
ownership is treated, not just across Europe, but world wide. 
6.2 How serious is the problem? 
One of the key conclusions of this thesis is that there is a significant problem with 
transparency of ownership around the world, even in the UK. The IIRF survey, made a 
number of relevant findings. Approximately 86% of Investor Relations Officers were in 
favour of pressing for reform, with 41% responding that they needed data not more 
than 1 month old to function effectively251. When asked whether national shareholder 
disclosure regulations do enough to ensure efficient communication between companies 
and their shareholders, 57% of responses were negative252. Fund managers, when 
surveyed, agreed that knowing the ownership structure of "a corporate" was an 
important factor to be considered (89% considered it a minor, significant or major factor 
2 5 0 Ibid., Barrier 13 
2 5 1 IIRF Survey Summary, available at ww.iirf.org, pp 3-5 
2 5 2 p. 17, above. 
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in their decision process253). Furthermore, nearly 90% of those surveyed preferred data 
less than 3 months old. Nearly 80% of fund managers understood that they were subject 
to declarable stake disclosure, but only 10% understood that they were obliged to 
respond to company requests254. Whilst only 65% accepted that in response to the 
continuing pressure on companies to disclose data to investors it was necessary to 
improve transparency, nearly 80% "perceived a benefit in greater transparency". 
We can draw three conclusions that are the most immediately relevant to this study. 
Firstly, that fund managers are notably uninformed, but the point must be 
conceded however that this sort of request would generally be dealt with by a fund 
management firms' compliance officer. While there is a lack of quantitative evidence to 
support this, it raises questions over the whole issue of a truly global equities market -
are fund managers world wide aware of the national law that resides over each security 
that they hold in each country? Are fund managers really aware of the differing rules 
regarding declarable stakes? Do fund managers understand the need to register their 
beneficial interests with central bodies, like the Finnish CSD in order to vote? Further 
research is needed to quantify these questions. 
The second issue raised is that both fund managers and corporate representatives 
understand the benefits that have been discussed above to greater transparency. This is 
a great encouragement and support to any reform proposal. 
2 5 3 p. 19 above. 
2 5 4 P.23 above. 
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Thirdly this research supports the hypothesis that companies require a timely disclosure 
of beneficial ownership and control so as to enable an efficient and effective process of market 
communication. If this proposition is supported by both legal analysis and practical opinion it 
must become much more persuasive. 
6.3 The future: are there any convincing solutions available? 
A number of possible reforms are immediately obvious as a way of improving the 
transparency process. These will be considered in turn 
6.3.1 Lowering the declarable stake threshold 
The first, and most obvious, system for reform is that of merely lowering the declarable 
stake threshold to either 1% or even 0.1%. Of Investor Relations Officers surveyed255, 43% saw 
this as the minimum level at which they would like to see disclosure of holdings. The Author 
respectfully submits that this solution, whilst seeming popular with both the corporates and 
representative of the current legislative direction256, is impractical, inflexible and does not deal 
with either the underlying legal or practical problems. Merely reducing the declarable stake 
would not solve the problem of non-response, both fraudulently and negligently by foreign 
nominees and institutions, in fact it would probably only serve to increase the incidence of 
non-compliance. The author, furthermore, agrees with Nick Arbuthnott who argues that a 
declarable stake of 0.1% would be utterly impractical, "it is very difficult to see what 
companies would do with all that data, how they would analyse it coherently - and 
2 5 5 IIRF Survey, above 
2 5 6 The threshold has fallen in subsequent companies acts, and has been addressed twice by EC directives 
The problem of identifying beneficial share ownership -120 -
Nick Stansbury, University of Durham 
furthermore...impossible to see how such a high administrative burden could be laid upon the 
institutions without their objecting extremely strongly"257. The fundamental arguments against 
declarable stakes in general have been set out in some detail above, and need not be repeated in 
full here. Clearly then, reducing the threshold for declarable stakes even further is not a viable 
method for reform, dealing neither with the underlying problems, nor being a practical and 
workable solution, being overly costly and difficult to administer, and with no mechanism for 
effective policing of responses. 
6.3.2 A pan-European s.212 provision 
The second obvious possibility is to introduce a pan-European s.212 provision, 
probably in the form of an EU directive. There were in fact private representations made 
by the UK based Quoted Companies Alliance at the time of the original consultation on 
the Transparency Directive258. This suggestion has a fair amount of merit. Firstly it 
removes, at least on a European level, a lot of the problems that exist with s.212's 
operation in the UK, specifically some of the problems with its operation in the cross-
border context. Secondly, s.212 provides a useful "investigatory" mechanism that is 
particularly useful in the context of hostile takeovers. If it were combined with a 
market-driven settlement based approach as discussed below, a pan-European s.212 
provision would be an excellent partial solution to the transparency problem. However, 
for all of the reasons given above, using the 7 test methodology, a pan-European s.212 
would be insufficient. 
2 5 7 London presentation - above 
258 private correspondence between the Author and the Q.C.A. 
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6.4 Where should the focus for the future be? 
It is possible to identify, from the above analysis, three key areas which need to be 
addressed by any proposed reforms. 
6.4.1 Firstly, any changes to the law need to operate on as wide a geographic scale as 
possible. The analysis earlier, particularly of the s.212 and Scandinavian provisions, has 
highlighted the need for transparency to be addressed in a trans-national manner. 
Owing to the current lack of a single global economic institution able to effect 
securities reform on a global basis, the most sensible immediate focus for reform would 
be the EU, particularly given the current focus on capital markets regulations across 
the EU. 
6.4.2 The concept of attaching one or more individuals with the proposed "investment 
discretion" authority is currently missing entirely from all transparency regimes. It is 
easy to understand why, given the frequency with which fund managers change jobs, 
and the current administrative burden of constantly updating this information. But, 
this information is absolutely crucial for the governance processes the author has 
argued depend on transparency to function correctly. It is absolutely essential that 
companies, regulators and ultimately the general public are able to hold to account 
specific individuals making the underlying investment, and more importantly, 
governance decisions. 
6.4.3 Finally, it is also apparent that transparency data needs to be collected in a systematic 
way, producing a minimal administrative burden, allowing for appropriate release to 
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the different parties in either a top down or a bottom up fashion. This implies the need 
for the involvement of a 3 rd party institution of some sort to collect and administer this 
data as well as to control its dispensation as appropriate. 
6.5 A market driven framework 
6.5.1 A theoretical basis 
One of the crucial questions in speculating about a possible solution to the 
problems discussed in this thesis is that of compulsion. If, as the author has argued, 
transparency has such great social utility, should all market participants be under a legal 
compulsion to fully disclose their holdings? The author believes not. For one, there are 
sections of the market who would be excluded from the market for reason of special 
legal consideration (such as Swiss institutions who would be unable to own any equities 
where they had to be fully transparent). More seriously, it would introduce a 
disincentive to owning equities in general. This would have the effect of raising the cost 
of equity capital - in the author's opinion unnecessarily. The author believes the market 
would more efficiently price equity capital if the market is allowed to allocate its own 
price to transparency. 
Then, whilst being a fundamentally legal process, left to its own devices, the 
market should in theory be capable of efficiently pricing stakeholder transparency 
without outside influence, this approach suffers from a fundamental conceptual 
problem, as well as the effect of price externalities (specifically the problem of "free 
loading") as already discussed: 
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Analogously, we hypothesise with respect to equity in publicly traded firms that organised capital 
markets will determine the optimal extent of shareholder identification and participation in 
corporate governance and that through an evolutionary process the standard corporate contract will 
acquire those optimal characteristics without government prodding...[but] to the Court, ... the state 
must be the "overseer..."...because "the very commodity that is traded in the 'market for corporate 
control' - the corporation - is one that owes its existence and attributes to state law259 
The point is a difficult one to argue with. Not only does the market, conceptually, "mis-
price" transparency, but the "market" for transparency is also one that is itself rooted in national 
legal systems. However, it is likely that the market will ultimately allocate resources much 
more efficiently than a state regulatory system will . The debate over corporate governance and 
the use of voting rights is to a certain extent paradigmatic, and the same conclusions can be 
drawn here. It will therefore be most efficient, as well as effective, for legal intervention to be 
minimised whilst ensuring that to the best extent possible externalised pricing factors are 
"internalised" through the use of financial and non financial corrective incentives. 
6.5.2 A proposed minimal legal framework and market institution 
It has already been argued that a proposed new structure need address 3 key areas. It 
needs to operate on a pan-European basis at the very least, attach a degree of personal 
responsibility and identity to holdings and to establish a centralised system which 
should operate in a low cost and effective manner. In addition to these three 
requirements, it has already been argued that the system should be primarily market 
driven with the minimal legislative intervention. 
2 5 9 - J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, "Corporate Takeovers, the commerce clause and the efficient 
anonymity of shareholders", 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1092 
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The author therefore proposes the following three actions by the European regulators, 
which are explained in more detail below. 
1) Establish a central body for the registration of "institutional" investors and the 
(possibly voluntary) registration of their ownership of all or most kinds of traded 
securities. 
2) Legislate to force European companies to withhold voting rights from the owners 
of unregistered securities, for a period of time, to allow a market to develop to 
accurately price a "privacy premium" into unregistered securities. 
3) Introduce an E.U. s.212 provision. 
The author has shown that individual institutional investors should be held accountable 
to society and to their underlying investors as to their actions because of the overall public 
benefits. Many countries recognise the importance of the role that individual institutional 
investors play and require them to register individually (for example the Financial Services 
Authority in the UK). One of the greatest practical difficulties with making individuals directly 
accountable has been the fact that they change jobs and roles frequently. Having a pan-
European central registry of suitably qualified and authorised individuals would bring two 
benefits. Firstly, it would provide a means for attaching personage to ownership information 
and secondly it would increase the general level of accountability of individuals. Centralising 
the administration and qualification of authorised individuals would also bring great benefits to 
the process of integration of European capital markets. 
This same institution could also use the various pan-European settlement and clearing 
houses to automatically register changes in ownership of all kinds of securities. This would 
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require some minor changes to the way that securities are traded and cleared, but could be 
funded by a very small additional charge on all transactions. Instead of placing deals with 
brokers, or directly on any market with instructions to settle the trade against an individual 
account as is generally the case, trades would have to be made by an authorised individual on a 
given account, and the identity of the authorised individual would need to be attached to the 
trade all the way through the settlement process. When the trade settled, the central 
registration of ownership would then be updated automatically (i.e. electronically), leaving an 
accurate register of not only the account in which the security is held, but also the name of the 
individual who authorised the trade. 
This would then leave the central register with a matrix of information which could be 
analysed in any number of ways. It could be broken down by institution (i.e. company), and get 
all holdings of European companies in which it invests. It could be used to feed data to 
companies, allowing them to get an instantaneous (possibly delayed by a short period of time, 
say 24 hours) view of their shareholder base, allowing for cheap and easy communication, as 
well as massively simplifying the voting process (all votes could then be cleared centrally 
through the register). The information could be made public after an appropriate period of time, 
allowing investors to assess the performance of the individuals who have been managing their 
investors, and to hold individual institutional investors to account for the way in which they 
carry out their responsibilities as owners. Such a central register need not, and should not, be 
limited to just equity investors. Debt instruments and derivatives could also be registered. 
In terms of total cost, no study has been carried out, and the author lacks the time and 
resources to make serious estimates of the cost of setting up such a central registry. However, 
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the author estimates that there is considerable cost borne by institutions in complying with 
s.212 notices and in monitoring and complying with declarable stake requirements which 
would become unnecessary under the proposed system. 
The author also proposes that, whilst the system would work effectively as a compulsory 
system, this would effectively force a portion of investors outside of the capital markets because 
of the high value that they place on their privacy. The ideal "solution" to the transparency 
problem would be, as already argued, market rather than regulatory driven, and so the author 
hypothesises that to achieve this, the above proposed solution would be more effective if 
voluntary, with the qualification that un-registered or un-transparent are treated differently by 
the underlying company. 
If a market based pricing mechanism to create a "privacy premium", as hypothesized 
above is to function effectively, regulations need to be introduced to support the distinction 
between registered and unregistered securities. The author believes that what is necessary is to 
remove the voting right from unregistered shares, to remove rights of "influence" debt 
securities (i.e. remove the right of a debt holder to enforce covenants) and to remove voting 
rights from shares that change hands as the result of the completion of a derivative contract. 
These rights, furthermore, should remain withheld for a period of time after the sale of an 
unregistered security, even if that security is then registered, possibly six months to a year. This 
would have the effect of creating a "secondary" market for unregistered shares and other 
securities. In the case of a share, the hypothetical difference in price can be expressed 
algebraically: 
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(PReg- PunReg)/ PRe g= (Probability of takeover * [1+ Expected Price Premium]) + y - v|/ 
Where Y|/ is the current market price of privacy and y is the control rights premium 
This equation demonstrates, in a simplified way, what form this secondary market might take, 
and why a market driven solution to the transparency problem has such merit. The equation 
implies that the price difference would depend on three factors. Firstly, and most obviously, i f 
voting rights are withheld then an unregistered share would not command the same premium 
as a registered share in the event of a takeover. Thus, the first part of the difference in price 
would be the product of the premium gained from a takeover and the expected chance of that 
takeover, all expressed as a percentage. The second proposed variable is the value of control 
rights to an equity holder, beyond that of a takeover. The right to influence management in the 
near term does have a value to an equity holder, and would be obviously absent from an 
unregistered share. Thirdly, the market price of privacy would also impact the difference in 
value, and would be different depending on the company in question. A number of observations 
should be made. 
6.5.2.1 The market price of privacy would vary from the value an individual institution places 
on privacy, creating a potentially perfect market for transparency 
The most crucial term in the proposed equation is that of the value of privacy. This 
obviously wil l vary depending not only on the company in question (the difference between 
registered and unregistered shares in Huntingdon Life Sciences would presumably be far greater 
than in Cadbury Schweppes) but also on the institution (Swiss Private banks would be the 
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obvious primary buyers of unregistered shares). Not only this, but arbitrage opportunities 
would also become available, with there being an incentive to "un-register" shares when the 
price discount becomes small enough, or when an individual felt that unregistered shares were 
trading at an unwarranted premium to registered shares. The same would apply to "registering" 
shares - where the discount between an unregistered share and a registered share grew too 
large, then there would be a financial incentive to "register" the shares and hold them for the 
time period specified to offset the price difference. 
6.5.2.2 The price differential would be fluid, allowing the market to create an excellent 
inherent incentive to exercise control rights 
One of the key advantages of the market driven system would be that, where the rights 
in question were important to an institution it would value them sufficiently to pay for 
registered shares, and where not important it would not need to pay for the premium. Not only 
this, but as time changed so the differential in price would change, so that where an important 
vote was to be held (say in the case of a proposed introduction of a poison pill, or a dispute 
between two groups of investors) the market would be able to efficiently price control rights. It 
is logical to assume that where control rights were being priced and valued by an institution, so 
there is then an incentive to actually use them. 
6.5.2.3 Whilst debt securities fit the framework well, derivatives are problematic 
As derivative rights crystallise into claims over actual equities, the system breaks down. 
It would, hypothetically, be possible to gain an interest through options in a security, and not 
have to register it for a number of months until the option actually crystallised. The author 
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proposes therefore that whilst securities changing hands because of options contracts should be 
treated in the same way, the options contract must itself be a registered security in order for the 
underlying security to not become immediately "un-registered" on change of ownership. 
Policing this might become complex in the case of someone intent on avoiding registration, and 
necessitates the third and final suggested reform proposal. 
In order to allow the regulator the capacity to investigate ownership claims and to police 
the registration system, as well as allowing companies the ability to drill down into ownership 
of unregistered securities under special circumstances, the author believes that this thesis has 
demonstrated the value and effectiveness of the limited use of s.212 powers. The author 
therefore, for all of the reasons given under the analysis of s.212, support its introduction on an 
EU wide basis through a directive. Even in absence of reform proposals 1 and 2, this would 
improve transparency on an E.U. wide basis significantly. 
6.6 Final thoughts 
Whilst a reform process as sweeping as the author has suggested above is unlikely, because 
of the limited consideration of the importance of the issue of transparency, the author believes 
it would be an extremely powerful and effective solution to the transparency problem. It would 
also reduce the role that market intermediaries, such as corporate brokers and investment 
banks, play in the capital markets, which given the lobbying power and influence that they 
hold, such a set of reforms are very unlikely to gather the necessary popularity that they would 
need to be adopted. The issue of transparency fits within the wider context of conflicts of 
interest in capital markets, the governance "problem", agency costs and the long running debate 
on voting rights. This thesis has, in many ways, only scratched the surface of understanding and 
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analysing the ways in which these various factors and issues inter-react. Much academic and 
professional ink has been spent on discussing these complex subjects and there is little reason to 
see a single unifying solution to these issues presenting itself in the near term. What is apparent, 
however, is that the role that capital markets play in global economic growth is vital, and that 
in a rapidly globalising world characterised by rising inequality and public disenfranchisement, 
that there is little room for complacency among market participants. The markets becoming 
more open and accountable is only one small part of a much wider and broader debate, the 
consequences of which are going to be extremely serious for everyone. Amongst this confusion 
the issue of the accountability of market participants is sometimes lost, and it is time that its 
importance and centrality was recognised fully. A good place to start might be the transparency 
of exactly who it is who are electing to empower and setting the objectives of those same 
"managers [who] now have more power than most sovereign governments to determine where 
people will live, what work they will do, if any; what they will eat, drink and wear; what sorts 
of knowledge, schools and universities they wil l encourage; and what kind of society their 
children wil l inherit." 2 6 0 
Richard J Barnet & Ronald Mueller, above at p.3 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix A - the history of s.212 in the UK 
Reproduced with permission from "A brief history of Part V I CA (1985)" by Nick Patton, DTI, 
261 
1. Obligations to make disclosure of interests in shares were first introduced by CA 1967, s 
33, though they had been recommended by the Cohen Committee in 1945262. CA 1948 had 
included Board of Trade powers - where there was "good reason" - for appointing inspectors to 
investigate ownership of a company (s 172), for requiring information on ownership and for 
imposing restrictions on shares and debentures. However, it imposed no automatic obligation 
on owners to disclose their interest at certain thresholds. 
2. The Cohen Committee had recommended an obligation to notify beneficial interests of 
1% or more in the issued capital of any company within 10 business days of becoming 
beneficial owner. The Jenkins Committee resurrected the idea in 1962, recommending a 10% 
threshold and a 7-day notification period. The 1967 act gave statutory effect to the idea. It set 
the threshold at 10% of shares carrying unrestricted voting rights and the notification period at 
14 days. It applied the rules only to companies quoted on a recognised stock exchange. This 
was subsequently amended and extended by CA 1967, ss. 26 and 27, which reduced the 
2 6 1 The above report was made available to the author privately, and is reproduced with permission here. It is not 
available publicly, to the author's knowledge and is reproduced here for background purposes. 
2 6 2 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, (1945) Cmd. 6659, page 44, (f)- Pages 77-45 dealt with 
the subject of Nominee Shareholdings, on which the Committee made a number of recommendations (a) to (n). 
Not all these found their way in the CA 1948, including recommendation (f) which required notification within 10 
days by beneficial owners becoming interested in more than 1% or more of share capital not registered in their 
name 
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threshold to 5% and the notification period to 5 business days. S 27 introduced a power for a 
company to require disclosure of beneficial interest in its voting shares. 
3. These sections were replaced by more comprehensive provisions in Part IV of the CA 
1981, following a DTI Consultative Document in 1980 which came out of the DTI inspection 
and Stock Exchange report on dealings in the shares of Consolidated Gold Fields. These 
provisions extended the obligation to notify to all public companies (redefined by the 1980 Act 
to implement the Second Company Law directive). In the light of Consolidated Gold Fields, 
they also introduced rules to catch group interests of persons acting together, or "concert 
parties". They also introduced rules allowing an investigation and report by the company, to be 
requisitions by members holding not less than 10% of the voting rights carried by the 
company's paid up capital. 
4. The CA 1981 provisions have been consolidated by CA 1985 (Part VI) and amended by 
the CA 1989 and various statutory instruments. Following a DTI Consultation Document in 
1988 and an earlier review of the operations of the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, the CA 
1989 reduced the threshold to 3% and the notification period to 2 days. Following a further 
DTI consultation document in 1991, the 1993 regulations were made to bring domestic 
legislation into compliance with EC Directive 88/267 (The "Major Shareholdings Directive") on 
the information to be published when a major shareholding in a listed company is acquired or 
disposed of. Company law, supplemented by relevant parts of the Listing Rules, currently goes 
further in some areas that the Directive requires. 
5. DTI considered proposals for reform of Part VI CA 1985 in a Consultation Document in 
1995, but failed to gain Parliamentary time to implement them. The results of the 1995 DTI 
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consultation were considered again and largely endorsed by the Company Law Review in 2001. 
They are currently being considered as part of wider plans to reform company law in the light 
of the Review's work. However they will need to reflect changes to EU law that wi l l take effect 
once the Transparency Obligations Directive, currently in the late stages of negotiation, has 
been approved. 
Key Dates and documents 
Year Event/Document Subject/Significance 
1945 Report of the Committee on Company Law 
Amendment ("The Cohen Report") 
Recommended: disclosure to all 
companies of beneficial holdings 
of 1% or more of its issued 
capital, to be notified within 10 
days and recoded on a company 
register. Not enacted 
1962 Report...("The Jenkins Report") Recommended: disclosure to 
quoted companies of beneficial 
holdings of 10% or more of its 
voting equity, to be notified 
within 7 days and recorded on a 
company register within 3 days 
of notification 
1967 Companies Act, 1967 
1968 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
established - City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers issued 
SARs and Code include 
disclosure rules in context of 
potential takeovers 
1976 CA 1976 
1980 DTI Consultative Document: Disclosure of 
interests in shares 
1981 CA 1981 
1985 CA 1985 Part VI 
1988 DTI Consultative Document: Disclosure of 
Interests in Shares 
European standards imposed to 
ensure minimum levels of 
market transparency 
1988 EC Directive 88/267 (the "Major 
Shareholdings Directive") 
1989 CA 1989 s.134 substituted 3% for 5% and 
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2 days for 5 days 
1991 DTI Consultative Document: Disclosure of 
Interests in Shares: The EC Major 
Shareholdings Directive 
1995 DTI Consultative Document: Proposals for 
Reform of Part VI of the CA 1985 URN 
96/633 
2000 FSA took over from LSE as UK listing 
authority 
2000 CLR: Developing the Framework (URN 
00/656) Paras. 4.178-4.181 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modcolaw.htm 
2001 CLR: Final Report (URN 01/942) 
Para. 7.32 
www.dti.gov.uk/cld/final_report/index.htm 
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